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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
NONMULTILATERAL ERA 
Peter K. Yu
 
Abstract 
In the past decade, countries have actively established bilateral, 
plurilateral, and regional trade and investment agreements, such as the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement. Although commentators have examined the conflict and 
tension between intellectual property and human rights in the past, the 
arrival of these agreements has ushered in a new era of nonmultilateralism 
that warrants a reexamination of the complex interrelationship between 
intellectual property and human rights. This Article closely examines the 
human rights impact of the intellectual property provisions in TRIPS-plus 
nonmultilateral agreements. It begins by outlining the challenges inherent 
in any analysis of the interface between intellectual property and human 
rights. It then examines the relationship between these agreements and the 
human rights system. The Article concludes with a discussion of the 
normative and systemic adjustments needed to alleviate the tension or 
conflict between these agreements and the international human rights 
system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, the European Union and the United States have 
actively established bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade and 
investment agreements.
1
 While the United States developed free trade 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher Heath 
& Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing free trade agreements in 
the intellectual property context); Pedro Roffe et al., Intellectual Property Rights in Free Trade 
Agreements: Moving Beyond TRIPS Minimum Standards, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 266 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010) 
(discussing free trade agreements in relation to the TRIPS framework); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee 
Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 259 
(criticizing the U.S.–Australia Free Trade Agreement); Jean-Frédéric Morin, Multilateralizing 
TRIPs-Plus Agreements: Is the US Strategy a Failure?, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175 (2009) 
(examining the United States’ free trade agreement strategy); Peter K. Yu, Currents and 
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392–
400 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents] (discussing the growing use of bilateral, 
plurilateral, and regional trade agreements to push for higher intellectual property standards); Peter 
K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 961–86 (2011) (critically examining 
the strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements). 
Although no clear distinctions exist between plurilateral agreements, regional agreements, 
and multilateral agreements, “plurilateral agreements” tend to refer to those agreements that are 
negotiated outside the traditional international or regional organizations or fora. The recently 
adopted Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement is a good example. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA]. 
Plurilateral agreements can also have a “loose” regional focus. Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio, 
for example, define “‘loose’ regional trade agreements” as “plurilateral agreements among countries 
which may or may not be in somewhat close proximity to each other, but do not necessarily include 
2
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agreements (FTAs), with a strong focus on trade, investment, and related 
areas, the European Union negotiated both FTAs and economic partnership 
agreements (EPAs) with its trading partners. Compared with FTAs, EPAs 
seek not only to promote free trade, but also to facilitate economic 
integration and stimulate local development. In addition to the United 
States and the European Union, emerging countries such as China
2
 and 
India
3
 have negotiated their own nonmultilateral trade agreements. 
Although these agreements bear some similarities to FTAs and EPAs, they 
also differ significantly in terms of their language, underlying goals, and 
negotiating approaches.
4
 
It remains to be seen whether these myriad agreements will eventually 
spark a race among the major trading powers, or even result in a “battle of 
the FTAs.”5 It is also unclear whether the recent agreements will 
subsequently be consolidated into a new multilateral arrangement.
6
 
Nevertheless, there is no denying that the establishment of these 
agreements has ushered in a new era of nonmultilateralism, which has 
raised difficult questions concerning appropriate policy responses.
7
 The 
arrival of this era has also rendered inadequate the existing literature on the 
interrelationship among various international regimes. 
The relationship between intellectual property and human rights is an 
area that deserves our renewed attention. Although commentators have 
                                                                                                                     
all countries from that area.” Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Introduction to BILATERAL AND 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 1, 2 (Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS]. 
 2. For discussions of China’s free trade agreements, or what I have termed “Sinic trade 
agreements,” see generally Henry Gao, The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit, in CHALLENGES 
TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 
53 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008); Marc Lanteigne, Northern Exposure: Cross-Regionalism and 
the China-Iceland Preferential Trade Negotiations, 202 CHINA Q. 362 (2010); Yu, Sinic Trade 
Agreements, supra note 1. 
 3. See Julia Ya Qin, China, India and WTO Law, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER 167, 196 (Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds., 2010) (“It was 
not until recent years that India began to enter into regional free trade arrangements with others, 
mostly its neighbouring countries.”); Wang Jiangyu, The Role of China and India in Asian 
Regionalism, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra, at 333, 356–58 
(discussing India’s regional trade initiatives). 
 4. See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 986–1018 (discussing the different 
underlying goals and negotiating approaches of China’s nonmultilateral agreements). 
 5. See id. at 1018–27 (identifying three potential “battles of the FTAs” caused by the 
differences between FTAs and EPAs on the one hand and China’s nonmultilateral agreements on 
the other). 
 6. See id. at 976 (noting that “bilateral and plurilateral agreements can help drive new norms 
that will be eventually consolidated in a multilateral setting”). 
 7. See Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1, 9–12 (2011) (discussing 
the rise of the nonmultilateral era). Policy adjustments will become even more important if this era 
continues for an extended period of time, as opposed to serving as a mere temporary transition 
before countries return their focus to the multilateral system. 
3
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examined at length the conflict and tension between these two regimes, as 
well as the human rights impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),
8
 the 
intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral agreements have 
generated new issues and problems while bringing to the debate many new 
voices. With the recent adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA)
9
 and the ongoing negotiation of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP),
10
 it is high time we revisit the debate on 
intellectual property and human rights. 
This Article closely examines the human rights impact of the 
intellectual property provisions in TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements. 
Part I demonstrates that the debate on intellectual property and human 
rights deserves our renewed attention. This Part further identifies five sets 
of new developments that justify a reexamination of the complex interplay 
between intellectual property and human rights. 
Part II outlines the challenges inherent in any analysis of the interface 
between intellectual property and human rights. Building on the human 
rights framework for intellectual property I have previously developed,
11
 
this Part notes the overlap between the intellectual property rights 
protected under TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements and the rights 
recognized in existing international or regional human rights instruments. 
It underscores the importance of distinguishing the human rights attributes 
of intellectual property rights from the non-human rights aspects of 
intellectual property protection. 
Part III examines the relationship between TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral 
                                                                                                                     
 8. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 9. ACTA, supra note 1; see also Yu, supra note 7 (discussing the complex politics behind 
the negotiation of ACTA); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948326 [hereinafter Yu, What 
Enforcement?] (suggesting ways to improve the design of an anticounterfeiting trade agreement); 
Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 [hereinafter Yu, Six 
Secret Fears] (discussing the serious concerns about ACTA). 
 10. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/ 
tpp (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (providing up-to-date information about the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement). See generally Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (2011) (discussing 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement); Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder 
Intellectual Property Enforcement, DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE, forthcoming June 2012, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2054950 (discussing why TPP is likely to be more dangerous than ACTA 
from a public interest standpoint). 
 11. See generally Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human 
Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007) (exploring ways to develop a human rights 
framework for intellectual property and to resolve the tension and conflict between human rights 
and the non-human rights aspects of intellectual property protection). 
4
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agreements and the human rights system. This Part discusses the 
compatibilities between intellectual property provisions in these 
agreements and the human rights system as well as the resulting synergies 
created within the system. This Part also examines the various 
impediments nonmultilateral agreements pose to greater protection of 
human rights. It discusses, in particular, the conflicts and inconsistencies 
within these agreements, the lost opportunities for promoting human rights, 
and the indirect systemic tension that the agreements have generated within 
the human rights system. 
Part IV concludes with a discussion of normative and systemic 
adjustments that seek to alleviate the tension or conflict between TRIPS-
plus nonmultilateral agreements and the international human rights system. 
It is my hope that these adjustments will help to strike a more appropriate 
balance between the protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and the commitments made in international or regional human rights 
instruments. 
I.  REVISITING THE DEBATE 
Until recently, policy makers, scholars, and activists have paid little 
attention to the implications of the intellectual property system for the 
protection of human rights.
12
 Their lack of interest was due in part to the 
arcane, obscure, complex, and highly technical nature of intellectual 
property law and policy
13
 and in part to the ability of countries to retain 
substantial policy space for developing their own intellectual property 
systems.
14
 When human rights issues arose, they were usually the result of 
                                                                                                                     
 12. As Professors Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin acknowledge: 
Long ignored by both the human rights and intellectual property communities, the 
relationship between these two fields has now captured the attention of 
government officials, judges, activist communities, and scholars in domestic legal 
systems and in international venues such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the World Trade Organization, the World 
Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. 
LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 1 (2011). 
 13. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 99 (2003) (“To a certain extent IP law is reminiscent of the Catholic Church 
when the Bible was in Latin. IP lawyers are privileged purveyors of expertise as was the Latin-
trained clergy.”); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual 
Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 975 (2007) (“Intellectual property has remained a normative 
backwater in the burgeoning post-World War II human rights movement, neglected by international 
tribunals, governments, and legal scholars while other rights emerged from the jurisprudential 
shadows.”); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 419 (2004) (“In the past, intellectual 
property issues were considered arcane, obscure, complex, and highly technical.”). 
 14. See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property 
5
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decisions made at the domestic level, including those made under heavy 
foreign pressure. Indeed, the two systems rarely interact with each other. 
As Professors Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin remind us: 
Human rights law . . . offered neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient justification for state-granted monopolies in 
intangible knowledge goods; nor, conversely, did it serve to 
check the expansion of intellectual property protection 
standards . . . . [To a great extent,] each legal regime was 
preoccupied with its own distinct concerns and neither saw 
the other as either aiding or threatening its sphere of influence 
or opportunities for expansion.
15
 
That position changed, however, when the TRIPS Agreement entered 
into force in January 1995. For the first time, the Agreement imposed a 
supersize-fits-all template on less developed countries for the protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights.
16
 The Agreement’s impact 
was more transformative and far-reaching than that of preexisting 
intellectual property conventions, such as the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property
17
 and the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
18
 Because the TRIPS Agreement 
introduced high, mandatory standards for the protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights, many countries, in particular those in the 
less developed world, lost considerable autonomy and policy space for 
developing their own intellectual property systems.
19
 
In view of the Agreement’s many deleterious effects on the protection 
of human rights in less developed countries, human rights bodies and 
commentators have lamented the conflict between the TRIPS Agreement 
and the international human rights system. For example, in Resolution 
2000/7 on “Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights,” the United 
Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights (U.N. Sub-Commission) declared: 
[A]ctual or potential conflicts exist between the 
                                                                                                                     
Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (discussing how the policy space of less developed 
countries has been increasingly enclosed in the name of international harmonization). 
 15. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 33–34. 
 16. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 364–67 (discussing the 
establishment of the TRIPS Agreement as a supranational code); Peter K. Yu, Teaching 
International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 923, 928–33 (2008) (discussing the 
transformational impact of the TRIPS Agreement on the field of intellectual property law). 
 17. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 
305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 18. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) (revised at Paris July 24, 1971). 
 19. See Yu, supra note 14, at 7–9. 
6
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implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization 
of economic, social and cultural rights in relation to, inter 
alia, impediments to the transfer of technology to developing 
countries, the consequences for the enjoyment of the right to 
food of plant variety rights and the patenting of genetically 
modified organisms, “bio-piracy” and the reduction of 
communities’ (especially indigenous communities’) control 
over their own genetic and natural resources and cultural 
values, and restrictions on access to patented pharmaceuticals 
and the implications for the enjoyment of the right to health.
20
 
A year later, in Resolution 2001/21, the Sub-Commission reiterated its 
concerns about the conflicts between intellectual property and human 
rights.
21
 While the problems brought about by the TRIPS Agreement were 
serious, the international community’s growing attention to the protection 
of traditional peoples, indigenous communities, and their knowledge and 
cultural expressions made the conflicts more salient.
22
 
Coming to the defense of the intellectual property system, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) noted the potential for the intellectual property 
and human rights systems to coexist.
23
 Instead of focusing on conflicts, the 
WTO emphasized the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement and 
                                                                                                                     
 20. Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2000/7, Intellectual Property Rights and Human 
Rights, 52d Sess., July 31–Aug. 18, 2000, pmbl., recital 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 
(Aug. 17, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b13c 
12569700046704e?Opendocument [hereinafter Resolution 2000/7]. 
 21. See Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2001/21, Intellectual Property and Human 
Rights, 53d Sess., July 30–Aug. 17, 2001, pmbl., recital 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/21 
(Aug. 16, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN. 
4.Sub.2.RES.2001.21.En?Opendocument (“Reiterating that actual or potential conflict exists 
between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights, in particular the rights to self-determination, food, housing, work, health and 
education, and in relation to transfers of technology to developing countries . . . .”). 
 22. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 432 (“[T]he increased attention given to the 
rights of indigenous peoples by U.N. agencies in the 1990s was among the catalysts that encouraged 
international human rights bodies to address intellectual property issues.” (footnote omitted)). 
 23. As the WTO declared: 
Rights under article 27.2 of the UDHR and article 15.1(c) of the ICESCR together 
with other human rights will be best served, taking into account their 
interdependent nature, by reaching an optimal balance within the IP system and by 
other related policy responses. Human rights can be used—and have been and are 
currently being used—to argue in favour of balancing the system either upwards 
or downwards by means of adjusting the existing rights or by creating new rights. 
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Protection of Intellectual 
Property Under the TRIPS Agreement, 24th Sess., Nov. 13–Dec. 1, 2000, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/18 (Nov. 27, 2000) (by WTO Secretariat), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/ 
doc.nsf/0/292864197888d603c12569ba00543291?Opendocument. 
7
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other international trade agreements.
24
 The U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights also declared that “[t]he balance between public and private 
interests found under [the international human rights instruments] is one 
familiar to intellectual property law.”25 
The debate on intellectual property and human rights therefore has 
generated two opposing camps: one embracing the conflict approach and 
the other the coexistence approach.
26
 While the conflict approach views the 
two sets of rights as being in fundamental conflict, the coexistence 
approach considers them essentially compatible. 
This debate was refined in 2006 by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in General Comment No. 17.
27
 This 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See id. (pointing out that the “TRIPS Agreement provides a fair amount of leeway”). 
 25. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights: Rep. of the High Commissioner, 
¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/590516104e92e87bc1256aa800 
4a8191/$FI LE/G0114345.pdf [hereinafter High Commissioner’s Report]; see also Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[I]t should not be forgotten that the 
Framers [of the U.S. Constitution] intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”); 
Estelle Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Coinciding and Cooperating, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 133, 134 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008) (“[H]uman 
rights and [intellectual property rights] do not ‘simply’ coexist but in fact most of them coincide 
from the outset, that is, they have the same goal . . . and as a result, in most cases, because of this 
similarity or identity of goals, they even ‘cooperate’ . . . .”); Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property 
and Human Rights: Learning to Live Together, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra, at 3, 12 (“Human rights and intellectual property were natural law cousins owing to their 
shared filiation with equity.”). 
 26. Professor Helfer summarizes the two approaches: 
The first approach views human rights and intellectual property as being in 
fundamental conflict. This framing sees strong intellectual property protection as 
undermining—and therefore as incompatible with—a broad spectrum of human 
rights obligations, especially in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
The prescription that proponents of this approach advocate for resolving this 
conflict is to recognize the normative primacy of human rights law over 
intellectual property law in areas where specific treaty obligations conflict. 
The second approach to the intersection of human rights and intellectual 
property sees both areas of law as concerned with the same fundamental question: 
defining the appropriate scope of private monopoly power that gives authors and 
inventors a sufficient incentive to create and innovate, while ensuring that the 
consuming public has adequate access to the fruits of their efforts. This school 
views human rights law and intellectual property law as essentially compatible, 
although often disagreeing over where to strike the balance between incentives on 
the one hand and access on the other. 
Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 48–49 (2003) (footnotes omitted); see also Paul L.C. Torremans, Copyright 
(and Other Intellectual Property Rights) as a Human Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 195, 196–97 (discussing the two different approaches). 
 27. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment 
8
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authoritative interpretation of Article 15(1)(c) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
28
 made clear 
that not all attributes of intellectual property rights have human rights 
status.
29
 As it explained in great depth: 
Human rights are fundamental as they are inherent to the 
human person as such, whereas intellectual property rights are 
first and foremost means by which States seek to provide 
incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the 
dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as well 
as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the 
integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions for the 
benefit of society as a whole. 
In contrast to human rights, intellectual property rights are 
generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed 
or assigned to someone else. While under most intellectual 
property systems, intellectual property rights, often with the 
exception of moral rights, may be allocated, limited in time 
and scope, traded, amended and even forfeited, human rights 
are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the 
human person. Whereas the human right to benefit from the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
one’s scientific, literary and artistic productions safeguards 
the personal link between authors and their creations and 
between peoples, communities, or other groups and their 
collective cultural heritage, as well as their basic material 
interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an 
adequate standard of living, intellectual property regimes 
primarily protect business and corporate interests and 
investments. Moreover, the scope of protection of the moral 
and material interests of the author provided for by article 15, 
paragraph 1(c), does not necessarily coincide with what is 
referred to as intellectual property rights under national 
legislation or international agreements. 
It is therefore important not to equate intellectual 
property rights with the human right recognized in article 15, 
                                                                                                                     
No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests 
Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author 
(Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006), available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,CESCR,,,441543594,0.html [hereinafter 
General Comment No. 17]. 
 28. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(c), Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force January 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 29. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 1. 
9
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paragraph 1(c).
30
 
 
Notwithstanding the differences between these two sets of rights, the 
CESCR recognized that some attributes of intellectual property rights 
“derive[] from the inherent dignity and worth of all persons.”31 These 
attributes are therefore protected under the ICESCR—and most likely 
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as well.
32
 
In the wake of General Comment No. 17, a number of scholars 
explored the need to develop a human rights framework for intellectual 
property.
33
 In a symposium on intellectual property and social justice, 
Professor Laurence Helfer utilized the CESCR’s documents to flesh out 
this framework, offering suggestions on how to mediate law and policy in 
the fields of intellectual property and human rights.
34
 Professor Kal 
Raustiala “question[ed] whether the infusion of human rights concepts and 
rhetoric will serve, on balance, to make international [intellectual property] 
rights more socially just, or just more powerful.”35 Taking a cue from 
Professor Helfer, I also explored ways to develop this framework and to 
resolve the tension and conflict between human rights and the non-human 
rights aspects of intellectual property protection.
36
 
At a much broader level, human rights concerns have been raised 
frequently and vocally in the debates concerning access to medicines,
37
 
access to knowledge,
38
 and the protection of traditional knowledge and 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Id. ¶¶ 1–3 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. ¶ 1. 
 32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 33. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 13; Yu, supra note 11. 
 34. See Helfer, supra note 13, at 977. 
 35. Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2007). 
 36. See generally Yu, supra note 11. 
 37. See Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2004/26, Access to Medication in the Context of 
Pandemics Such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 60th Sess., Mar. 15–Apr. 23, 2004, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/26 (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/ 
resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2004-26.doc. 
 38. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability for 
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 819 (2007) (“To the extent that development is driven not 
only by economic growth but also by cultural and social change, education is foundational.”); Ruth 
L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public Interest 
Considerations for Developing Countries 2 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper 
No. 15, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc200610_en.pdf (“[W]ith regard to 
education and basic scientific knowledge, limitations and exceptions are an important component in 
creating an environment in which domestic economic initiatives and development policies can take 
root. A well-informed, educated and skilled citizenry is indispensable to the development 
process.”). 
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cultural expressions.
39
 Two edited volumes exploring the complex 
interrelationship between intellectual property and human rights have also 
been published—one by Professor Paul Torremans of the University of 
Nottingham
40
 and the other by Professor Willem Grosheide of Utrecht 
University.
41
 In 2011, Cambridge University Press published a highly 
welcome text: Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the 
Global Interface, by Professors Helfer and Austin.
42
 This new text will 
likely inspire the development of new seminars while shaping the next 
generation of human rights scholars interested in intellectual property 
issues. 
In light of this growing volume of literature, one may hesitate to revisit 
the debate on intellectual property and human rights. This Article, 
however, argues that we should not hesitate. The gravity of the issues 
involved and the wide implications of the debate on intellectual property 
and human rights provide a strong justification for scholars to undertake 
research in the area. The changing laws, policies, technologies, and 
practices have also brought about five sets of new developments that 
justify a reexamination of the complex interrelationship between 
intellectual property and human rights. 
First, countries have actively utilized nonmultilateral agreements to 
provide new and higher standards for the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. While this trend predated the publication of a 
wide array of human rights documents
43
 and legal literature examining the 
interrelationship between intellectual property and human rights, the recent 
adoption of ACTA and the ongoing negotiation of TPP have increased our 
urgency to revisit the debate on intellectual property and human rights. 
Consider, for example, ACTA, a highly controversial plurilateral 
agreement that sought to raise the standards of intellectual property 
protection and enforcement beyond the TRIPS requirements.
44
 This 
anticounterfeiting agreement facilitates the provision of ex officio authority 
to suspend allegedly infringing goods.
45
 It also calls for the introduction of 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 65 (encouraging “the adaptation of IP 
systems so that they fully take into account cultural and other rights of indigenous and local 
communities”); Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human 
Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 740–44 (2007) (discussing the protection of human rights in 
relation to the interests of indigenous peoples and traditional communities). 
 40. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25.  
 41. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX (Willem Grosheide ed., 2010) 
[hereinafter A PARADOX]. 
 42. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12. 
 43. See id. at 53–56 (listing the various documents). 
 44. See ACTA, supra note 1, pmbl., recital 4 (“Intending to provide effective and appropriate 
means, complementing the TRIPS Agreement, for the enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
taking into account differences in their respective legal systems and practices . . . .”). 
 45. See id. arts. 16.1(a)–.2(a); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Trading’s End: Is ACTA the 
Leading Edge of a Protectionist Wave?, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 6, 2011, 2:48 PM), 
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preestablished or statutory damages
46
 and criminal penalties for activities 
that infringe on copyrights, even though such infringements have only 
“indirect economic or commercial advantage.”47 Depending on its 
implementation, ACTA could affect how injunctions are granted and 
damages calculated.
48
 The Agreement might even result in the creation of 
new penalties for “aiding and abetting” intellectual property 
infringements.
49
 
Even worse, many countries have questioned the legitimacy of this 
plurilateral agreement, due largely to the developed countries’ use of a 
“country club” approach to set a higher benchmark among like-minded 
countries.
50
 Exemplifying this concern was the participation of only two 
less developed countries—Mexico and Morocco—in the negotiations 
beyond the first round.
51
 Even if one counts Jordan and the United Arab 
Emirates, which participated only in the first round, no more than four 
percent of the world’s developing-country governments were involved in 
the ACTA negotiations.
52
 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/05/06/trading%e2%80%99s-end-is-acta-the-leading-edge-of-
a-protectionist-wave/ (“Probably the most problematic provisions mandate that customs authorities 
be enabled to act ex officio to seize ‘suspect goods’ at the border, without definition of the basis for 
suspicion, and without mandating that a determination be made regarding the offense the suspect 
goods allegedly commit.”). 
 46. See ACTA, supra note 1, art. 9.3. Article 9.3 specifically provides: 
At least with respect to infringement of copyright or related rights protecting 
works, phonograms, and performances, and in cases of trademark counterfeiting, 
each Party shall also establish or maintain a system that provides for one or more 
of the following: 
(a) pre-established damages; or 
(b) presumptions for determining the amount of damages sufficient to 
compensate the right holder for the harm caused by the infringement; or 
(c) at least for copyright, additional damages. 
Id. (footnote omitted). For criticisms of preestablished or statutory damages, see generally Pamela 
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal 
Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 716–19 (2010); J. Cam Barker, Note, 
Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of 
Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004). 
 47. ACTA, supra note 1, art. 23.1. 
 48. See generally James Love, Comments on ACTA Provisions on Injunctions and Damages, 
JAMES LOVE’S BLOG (Apr. 6, 2010, 9:29 PM), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/kei_rn_ 
2010_1.pdf (discussing the ACTA provisions on injunctions and damages). 
 49. See ACTA, supra note 1, art. 23.4 (“With respect to the offences specified in [Article 23] 
for which a Party provides criminal procedures and penalties, that Party shall ensure that criminal 
liability for aiding and abetting is available under its law.”). 
 50. See generally Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 9, at 1074–83 (criticizing the “country 
club” approach). 
 51. See ACTA, supra note 1, art. 39 n.17. 
 52. An article in Inside U.S. Trade suggested that Uruguay might have also been involved in 
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Moreover, the adoption of ACTA and the ongoing negotiation of TPP 
have rendered inadequate many of the existing analyses of the tension or 
conflict between the TRIPS Agreement and the human rights system. For 
example, although the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
recommended that “developing countries be cautious about enacting 
‘TRIPS plus’ legislation . . . without first understanding the impact of such 
legislation on the protection of human rights,”53 her report did not 
anticipate that plurilateral agreements would be used primarily to 
circumvent the multilateral process. To a great extent, the development of 
ACTA, TPP, and other nonmultilateral agreements has brought intellectual 
property issues to the forefront of the human rights debate. 
Second, the increased sophistication of piracy and counterfeiting 
networks
54
 and the rapid development of potentially disruptive digital 
technology
55
 have necessitated the introduction of new enforcement 
measures at both the domestic and international levels.
56
 While some of 
these measures were designed to address traditional cross-border issues—
issues that were present, but not successfully resolved during the TRIPS 
negotiations
57—others were created as responses to problems brought 
about by the advent of the World Wide Web and the proliferation of new 
communications technologies.
58
 
A case in point is the recent introduction of the graduated response 
system—or what some commentators and policy makers have termed the 
“three strikes” rule or the “notice and termination” procedure.59 Targeting 
unauthorized copying on the Internet, this system enables Internet service 
providers to take a wide variety of actions after giving users warnings 
about their potentially illegal online file-sharing activities.
60
 Permissible 
                                                                                                                     
the prenegotiation discussions. EU ACTA Negotiator Confirms EU Wants Patent Provisions in 
ACTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 8, 2009, at 11. 
 53. High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 69. 
 54. See TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E. ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS 618 (2008) (stating that “greater enforcement efforts are needed given the 
increasing sophistication of counterfeiters and pirates”). 
 55. For discussions of the massive unauthorized copying problem created by peer-to-peer 
technology, see generally Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 
653 (2005); Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004). 
 56. See Yu, What Enforcement?, supra note 9. 
 57. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 483–504 
(2011) (discussing the weaknesses of the TRIPS enforcement provisions). 
 58. See id. at 502–03. 
 59. For discussions of the gradated response system, see generally Annemarie Bridy, 
Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. 
REV. 81 (2010); Eldar Haber, The French Revolution 2.0: Copyright and the Three Strikes Policy, 2 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297 (2011); Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Call for 
Copyright Law Makers—Is the “Graduated Response” a Good Reply?, 1 WIPO J. 75 (2009); Peter 
K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010). 
 60. See Yu, supra note 59, at 1374. 
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actions include suspensions or terminations of service; capping of 
bandwidth; and blocking of sites, portals, and protocols. To date, Chile, 
France, South Korea, and Taiwan have adopted this system, while 
Germany, Hong Kong, Spain, Sweden, and the European Parliament have 
rejected it.
61
 
Third, with the growing use of the Internet and new communications 
technologies, the tension between intellectual property and human rights is 
no longer limited to economic, social, and cultural rights.
62
 Instead, the 
debate also implicates civil and political rights, rights that many in Europe 
and the United States have considered of a higher priority.
63
 The resulting 
elevated status of the conflict between intellectual property and human 
rights has also awakened many individuals and communities who 
otherwise would not engage in the debate. These new voices express a 
wide array of concerns that have not been fully articulated until now. 
Fourth, as individuals continue to participate in creative communities, 
producing what commentators have euphemistically described as “user-
generated content,”64 the protection of human rights interests in intellectual 
creations is no longer limited to a subclass of individual authors.
65
 Such 
limitation reminds us of the concerns raised by delegates during the 
drafting of the UDHR. As British delegate F. Corbet noted, “[T]he 
declaration of human rights should be universal in nature and only 
recognize general principles that were valid for all men [and women].”66 
Alan Watt, the Australian delegate, concurred, adding that “the 
indisputable rights of the intellectual worker could not appear beside 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2011, at 3, 19 
(2011), available at http://ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2012.pdf; Yu, supra note 59, at 1377. 
 62. Thanks to Xavier Seuba for pointing this out. 
 63. See MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 9 (1995) (“Western States . . . asserted the 
priority of civil and political rights as being the foundation of liberty and democracy in the ‘free 
world.’”); JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 27 (2d ed. 2003) 
(“We should . . . note that in some Western circles a lingering suspicion of economic and social 
rights persists.”). 
 64. Commentators and industry representatives have questioned the term “user-generated 
content.” Compare Alan N. Braverman & Terri Southwick, The User-Generated Content 
Principles: The Motivation, Process, Results and Lessons Learned, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471, 
471 (2009) (“UGC . . . is not always user-generated; it would more accurately be called user-posted 
content.”), and Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-
Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 842 (2009) (“Let me be perfectly clear: there 
is no such thing as ‘user-generated content.’”), with Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and 
the Future of Copyright: Part One—Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863, 
870–74 (2008) (providing a definition of user-generated content). 
 65. See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, 
DRAFTING, AND INTENT 221 (1999) (recounting that Mexican delegate Pablo Campos Ortiz 
identified the right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations as a right of the individual 
as “an intellectual worker, artist, scientist or writer”). 
 66. Id. 
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fundamental rights of a more general nature, such as freedom of thought, 
religious freedom or the right to work.”67 The sentiments of both delegates 
echoed those voiced earlier by delegates from India and the United 
Kingdom who “felt that no special group should be singled out for 
attention.”68 
Thanks to new technology and increased digital literacy, the ability to 
create today is no longer limited to a small subclass of “intellectual 
workers” or “creative laborers.” Instead, a growing number of individuals 
from both developed and less developed countries now have the ability to 
exploit their rights to the protection of the moral and material interests in 
intellectual creations.
69
 As this community of creative individuals grows, 
these rights will become more universal in nature, with most considering 
them valid for all humans. The present technological and cultural 
environments have therefore rendered irrelevant those earlier concerns 
raised during the drafting of the UDHR. 
To some extent, the increasing focus on the authors’ human rights has 
made the intellectual property system more author-centric.
70
 There also 
remain very challenging questions concerning whether the right to create 
should include the right to use others’ creations to create—a perennial 
debate among copyright scholars.
71
 Notwithstanding these complex 
questions, there is no question that we continue to need a vibrant debate on 
intellectual property and human rights. 
Finally, the U.N. human rights bodies have undertaken many important 
activities since the release of General Comment No. 17, the last major 
impetus driving the recent scholarship on intellectual property and human 
rights. In December 2009, the CESCR released General Comment No. 21, 
                                                                                                                     
 67. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 185; MORSINK, supra note 65, at 221.  
 68. MORSINK, supra note 65, at 220; see also Audrey R. Chapman, Core Obligations Related 
to ICESCR Article 15(1)(c), in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 305, 313 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell eds., 2002) [hereinafter CORE 
OBLIGATIONS] (stating that “other members of the [UDHR] drafting committee claimed that special 
protection for intellectual property entailed an elitist perspective”). 
 69. The universal nature of the right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations was 
first asserted by Chang Peng-chun, the Chinese delegate and one of the Declaration’s key drafters. 
Taking a populist approach, he noted that “the purpose of the joint amendment [from Cuba, France 
and Mexico to include such a right] was not merely to protect creative artists but to safeguard the 
interests of everyone.” MORSINK, supra note 65, at 221–22. Nevertheless, his primary focus was on 
the need to protect the integrity of the creative work for the benefit of all individuals. As he 
explained, “Literary, artistic and scientific works should be made accessible to the people directly in 
their original form. This could only be done if the moral rights of the creative artist were protected.” 
Id. at 222.  
 70. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1131 (“[T]he recognition of the human rights attributes of 
intellectual property rights may challenge the structure of the traditional intellectual property 
system. In the copyright context, for example, such recognition will encourage the development of 
an author-centered regime, rather than one that is publisher-centered.”). 
 71. See Yu, supra note 59, at 1399–1400. 
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a new interpretative comment on “the right of everyone . . . [t]o take part in 
cultural life” as recognized in Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR.72 The 
Committee is also in the process of drafting an additional general comment 
on “the right of everyone . . . [t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific progress 
and its applications” as recognized in Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR.73 
Moreover, the year 2011 celebrates the silver anniversary of the 
Declaration on the Right to Development,
 74
 which the U.N. General 
Assembly adopted in December 1986. Such celebration is particularly 
timely in light of the many development agendas that have recently sprung 
up at the WTO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the 
World Health Organization (WHO), and in other international fora 
governing biological diversity, food and agriculture, and information and 
communications.
75
 An increased focus on the right to development is also 
important in light of the growing concern among less developed countries 
that their more developed counterparts are circumventing the multilateral 
process in an effort to establish new and higher standards of intellectual 
property enforcement.
76
 
In sum, the human rights impact of the intellectual property system 
remains an important issue deserving our renewed attention. The arrival of 
new nonmultilateral agreements and the rapid changes in the cultural, 
economic, and technological environments have generated new issues 
previously unexplored in great depth. The stakes implicated by 
nonmultilateral agreements and new enforcement measures are also much 
higher than those implicated by the TRIPS Agreement. It is therefore high 
time we revisit the debate on intellectual property and human rights. 
                                                                                                                     
 72. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art. 15, Para. 1(a), of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/gc/E-C-12-GC-21.doc. 
 73. See Press Release, Public Consultation, The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific 
Progress and Its Applications: Consultation Organized by the Independent Expert in the Field of 
Cultural Rights, Ms. Farida Shaheed, Palais des Nations, Room XXIII (Dec. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/CulturalRights/Pages/Consultation7December2011.aspx (providing 
information about the public consultation). 
 74. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 41st 
Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986), available at http://www.un.org/en/events/rightto 
development/declaration.shtml. 
 75. See Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 522–
40 (2009). 
 76. See Minutes of Meeting, Council for TRIPS, World Trade Org. ¶¶ 248–73, IP/C/M/63 
(Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=&doc= 
D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FIP%2FC%2FM63%2EDOC%2EHTM (reporting about 
China and India’s interventions at the June 2010 TRIPS Council meeting, in which they heavily 
criticized the ACTA negotiations and the highly disturbing trend of establishing TRIPS-plus 
enforcement standards); see also Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 9, at 1074–83 (criticizing the 
developed countries’ use of the “country club” approach to circumvent the multilateral process). 
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II.  INHERENT ANALYTICAL CHALLENGES 
Notwithstanding the importance and urgency of examining the human 
rights impact of TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements, the analysis of the 
relationship between intellectual property and human rights is fraught with 
challenges. Consider the following questions: Which forms or attributes of 
intellectual property rights should be protected at the level of human 
rights? Which rights should be considered under the rubric of “human 
rights” for the purpose of the analysis? Can corporate rights holders 
possess human rights at all? This Part explores each of these questions in 
turn. 
The answers to these questions inevitably depend on one’s worldview, 
basic assumptions, ideological values, and philosophical predispositions. 
For instance, the approach taken in this Article is unlikely to convince 
those who insist that no intellectual property right can attain human rights 
status. Likewise, the approach will not appeal to those who see very little 
value in a human rights discourse in the intellectual property debate. Thus, 
rather than convincing readers to subscribe to the approach laid out in this 
Article and my previous scholarship, this Part seeks to inform readers 
about my assumptions and choices. Readers can then adjust their analyses 
based on their own basic theoretical assumptions, ideological values, and 
philosophical predispositions. 
A.  IP Rights as Human Rights? 
The first challenge concerns the human rights attributes of intellectual 
property rights. As discussed earlier, policy makers, international 
bureaucrats, academic commentators, and civil society organizations 
traditionally examine the interface between intellectual property and 
human rights by using either the conflict approach or the coexistence 
approach.
77
 Although each of these approaches has benefits and 
drawbacks, both ignore the fact that some attributes of intellectual property 
rights are protected in international human rights instruments while other 
attributes do not have any human rights basis. For example, it is rather easy 
to identify the human rights basis of copyrights and, to some extent, 
patents,
78
 but it is much harder to justify human rights protection for 
                                                                                                                     
 77. See supra Part I. 
 78. See Yu, supra note 39, at 721–26 (discussing the question concerning whether patents 
should be separated from copyrights in the human rights debate). But see Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where Is the Paradox?, in A PARADOX, supra note 41, at 73 
(“As a theoretical matter, there are clearly dimensions to intellectual property that sound in human 
rights concerns (rights to protect one’s dignity, to be compensated for one’s labor, and to enjoy 
one’s property without arbitrary governmental interference). But at least on the patent side, there is 
little reason to think that the human rights concerns associated with creative labor must be furthered 
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corporate trademarks and trade secrets, works made for hire, employee 
inventions, neighboring rights for broadcasters and phonogram producers, 
database protection, protection for clinical trial data, and other rights that 
primarily protect the economic investments of institutional authors and 
inventors.
79
 
Thus, instead of inquiring whether intellectual property and human 
rights conflict or coexist with each other, it is important to distinguish the 
human rights attributes of intellectual property rights from the non-human 
rights aspects of intellectual property protection. Article 27(2) of the 
UDHR states, “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he [or she] is the author.”80Article 15(1)(c) of the 
ICESCR also requires state parties to “recognize the right of 
everyone . . . [t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he [or she] is the author.”81 
In view of these provisions, the tension between TRIPS-plus 
nonmultilateral agreements and the international human rights system is 
not simple categorical tension between intellectual property rights and 
human rights. Rather, tension exists between the non-human rights aspects 
of intellectual property protection and human rights, including the human 
rights attributes of intellectual property rights. Although commentators 
tend to emphasize the conflict between intellectual property rights and 
human rights, the intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral 
agreements, in certain circumstances, can create synergy between the 
two.
82
 
 
                                                                                                                     
by recognizing a right to full control over the information that creative labor produces.”); Wendy J. 
Gordon, Current Patent Laws Cannot Claim the Backing of Human Rights, in A PARADOX, supra 
note 41, at 155–56 (dispelling “the notion that current patent laws are the manifestation of the 
human right commitment to authors under the ICESCR”). 
 79. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Social Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Drafting 
History of the Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/15 (Oct. 9, 2000) (by Maria Green) [hereinafter Drafting 
History of the Article 15(1)(c)], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c 
1256a450044f331/872a8f7775c9823cc1256999005c3088/$FILE/G0044899.pdf (“[T]he drafters 
[of the ICESCR] do not seem to have been thinking in terms of the corporation-held patent, or the 
situation where the creator is simply an employee of the entity that holds the patent or the 
copyright.”); Chapman, supra note 68, at 316–17 (noting that there is no “basis in human rights to 
justify using intellectual property instruments as a means to protect economic investments”). 
 80. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 27(2). 
 81. ICESCR, supra note 28, art. 15(1)(c). 
 82. See infra Part III.A. 
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B.  No Consensus on Human Rights? 
The second challenge concerns the type of human rights that the 
analysis should cover. Despite decades of efforts establishing the 
international human rights system, countries have yet to agree on the 
nature, scope, and meaning of human rights obligations. While the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action states that “[a]ll human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated,”83 the document 
is mostly aspirational. As mentioned earlier, many governments, policy 
makers, and commentators still have yet to view all forms of human rights 
as having the same weight and priority.
84
 Many of them continue to 
prioritize civil and political rights over rights of later generations, such as 
economic, social, and cultural rights (second-generation rights) or 
collective rights for minorities, indigenous peoples, and traditional 
communities (third-generation rights).
85
 
                                                                                                                     
 83. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993), available at http://www.un 
hchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En (“All human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.”). 
 84. See CRAVEN, supra note 63, at 9 (“Western States . . . asserted the priority of civil and 
political rights as being the foundation of liberty and democracy in the ‘free world.’”); Rosemary J. 
Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law 
Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 60 (1998) (“[E]conomic, social, and cultural rights have been juridically 
marginalized in comparison to civil and political rights, both in terms of the institutional 
frameworks developed for their implementation and in terms of their judicial interpretation . . . .”); 
Helfer, supra note 13, at 987 (stating that economic, social, and cultural rights remain “the least 
well-developed and the least doctrinally prescriptive”). 
 85. As Professor Matthew Craven explains: 
That economic, social, and cultural rights have been identified as a discrete 
category of human rights is most usually explained in terms of their distinct 
historical origin. Economic, social, and cultural rights are frequently termed 
“second generation” rights, deriving from the growth of socialist ideals in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the rise of the labour movement in 
Europe. They contrast with the “first generation” civil and political rights 
associated with the eighteenth-century Declarations on the Rights of Man, and the 
“third generation” rights that encompass the rights of “peoples” or “groups”, such 
as the right to self-determination and the right to development. In fact the reason 
for making a distinction between first and second generation rights could be more 
accurately put down to the ideological conflict between East and West pursued in 
the arena of human rights during the drafting of the Covenants. The Soviet States, 
on the one hand, championed the cause of economic, social, and cultural rights, 
which they associated with the aims of the socialist society. Western States, on the 
other hand, asserted the priority of civil and political rights as being the 
foundation of liberty and democracy in the “free world”. The conflict was such 
that during the drafting of the International Bill of Rights the intended treaty was 
divided into two separate instruments which were later to become the ICCPR 
[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] and the ICESCR. 
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To complicate matters, policy makers and commentators subscribe to 
different conceptions of human rights. While some take a highly 
philosophical approach that relies heavily on first principles and natural 
law, others take a more positive approach that focuses on compromises in 
existing international or regional human rights instruments. As Professor 
Richard Falk observes: 
The positivists consider the content of human rights to be 
determined by the texts agreed upon by states and embodied 
in valid treaties, or determined by obligatory state practice 
attaining the status of binding international custom. The 
naturalists, on the other hand, regard the content of human 
rights as principally based upon immutable values that endow 
standards and norms with a universal validity.
86
 
Some commentators also question how relatively trivial matters such as 
intellectual property rights can be equated with such fundamental rights as 
the “prohibition on genocide, slavery, and torture; the rights to freedom of 
thought, expression, association, and religion; and the rights to life, food, 
health, basic education, and work.”87 That question was indeed raised 
during the drafting of the UDHR. Alan Watt declared that “‘the 
indisputable rights of the intellectual worker could not appear beside 
fundamental rights of a more general nature, such as freedom of thought, 
religious freedom or the right to work.’”88 
Although both the philosophical and positive approaches have merits, 
this Article focuses on the latter, for at least three reasons.
89
 First, the 
                                                                                                                     
CRAVEN, supra note 63, at 8–9; see also Asbjørn Eide & Allan Rosas, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 
3–4 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1995) (discussing use of the terms “first generation,” “second 
generation,” and “third generation” to distinguish between different types of human rights). 
 86. Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 44 (Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Naʿim ed., 1992); see also THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 59 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the distinction 
between legal and moral human rights). 
 87. Yu, supra note 39, at 713; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE xi (1991) (“A rapidly expanding catalog of rights . . . not 
only multiplies the occasions for collisions, but it risks trivializing core democratic values. A 
tendency to frame nearly every social controversy in terms of a clash of rights . . . impedes 
compromise, mutual understanding, and the discovery of common ground.”); Philip Alston, 
Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607 (1984) 
(expressing concern that the continuous proclamation of new human rights will undermine both the 
fundamental nature of human rights and the integrity of the process of recognizing those rights). 
 88. MORSINK, supra note 65, at 221 (quoting Alan Watt, the Australian delegate). 
 89. This approach is not without its weaknesses. For example, Professors William Fisher and 
Talha Syed identify two main weaknesses of the positivist approach: 
First, by tying a right to health strictly to what is recognized in legal documents 
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drafting histories of the UDHR and the ICESCR show that it is difficult for 
countries to achieve a political consensus on the rights recognized in the 
instruments.
90
 Given their divergent interests, backgrounds, beliefs, and 
cultures, countries are very unlikely to succeed in achieving an 
international philosophical consensus on these rights. As Professor Jack 
Donnelly reminds us, “few issues in moral or political philosophy are more 
contentious or intractable than theories of human nature.”91 Thus, it makes 
great pragmatic sense to focus on rights that have already attained 
international consensus, if not universal agreement.
92
 
Second, international human rights instruments thus far have received 
significant attention in the international debate concerning the human 
rights implications of intellectual property protection. The plain language 
of these instruments is therefore likely to have a significant impact on the 
future development of the international intellectual property system. While 
commentators may question whether the UDHR has achieved the status of 
customary international law,
93
 this Declaration, along with other 
                                                                                                                     
the analysis limits its scope of protection to claims against governments acting 
within their own sovereign territories (and, perhaps, only to certain types of 
“negative” claims). Second, implementing the right requires knowing what its 
substantive requirements should be and how tradeoffs with other rights or 
priorities are to be made, and to answer those questions adequately we need to 
draw on extra-legal normative considerations. 
William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the 
Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 642 (2007) (footnote omitted). “One could also add 
a third weakness concerning how this approach would encourage one to ignore important goals and 
interests that have strong moral bases but have yet to be recognized politically by the international 
community.” Yu, supra note 39, at 716. 
 90. See generally Drafting History of the Article 15(1)(c), supra note 79 (providing a drafting 
history of Article 15(1) of the ICESCR); MORSINK, supra note 65, at 217–22 (providing a detailed 
drafting history of Article 27(2) of the UDHR); Yu, supra note 11, at 1047–75 (providing the 
drafting history of the right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations in international 
human rights instruments). 
 91. DONNELLY, supra note 63, at 16. 
 92. Cf. JAMES HARRISON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
18–19 (2007) (“A legal positivist approach . . . helps to overcome many of the philosophical 
differences that would otherwise undermine the usefulness of a human rights methodology in the 
trade law context.”). 
 93. See JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 
75–76 (1984) (providing evidence that the UDHR “is now part of the customary law of nations”); 
Richard Pierre Claude, Scientists’ Rights and the Human Right to the Benefits of Science, in CORE 
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 68, at 247, 252 (“[A]fter fifty years, the Universal Declaration . . . has 
begun to take on the qualities of ‘customary international law.’”); Torremans, supra note 26, at 201 
(“[W]here initially Member States were not obliged to implement [the Declaration] on the basis 
[that it is merely aspirational or advisory in nature], it has now gradually acquired the status of 
customary international law and of the single most authoritative source of human rights norms.”). 
See generally THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 
(1989) (examining human rights and humanitarian law in relation to the general principles of 
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international and regional human rights instruments, has undeniably 
achieved an international normative consensus.
94
 
Third, based on the usual approach to drafting international 
agreements, the provisions in international human rights instruments “do 
not necessarily have a commonly agreed-upon purpose (other than a broad 
one to promote human dignity and respect).”95 As Professor James Nickel 
points out, “[P]eople can agree on human rights without agreeing on the 
grounds of human rights.”96 During treaty drafting processes, delegates 
often harbor disparate concerns and vote based on different motivations. In 
the context of Article 27 of the UDHR, these motivations “ranged from the 
protection of moral rights to international harmonization to collateral 
realization of other human rights.”97 In retrospect, no one can pinpoint 
exactly what motivated the delegates to adopt a particular provision. 
Indeed, international instruments cannot escape the realpolitik of 
international negotiations no matter how much foresight the drafters had. 
As one commentator observes: 
[H]uman rights codifications inevitably convey a somewhat 
incomplete, or even biased, image of what human rights really 
are. All of them have been drafted and enacted under specific 
political and economic circumstances, and therefore reflect 
the mindsets and specific concerns of their drafters and the 
time they lived in. They are often the fruit of political 
compromise—a constraint to which moral truth is not 
exposed.
98
 
According to Professor Donnelly, human rights are far from “timeless, 
unchanging, or absolute; any list or conception of human rights—and the 
idea of human rights itself—is historically specific and contingent.”99 
C.  Human Rights for Corporate Owners? 
The final challenge concerns the increasing willingness of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to extend human rights 
protection to non-individuals, such as corporate owners of intellectual 
                                                                                                                     
international law). 
 94. See DONNELLY, supra note 63, at 17 (“[T]here is a remarkable international normative 
consensus on the list of rights contained in the Universal Declaration and the International Human 
Rights Covenants . . . .”); id. at 40–41 (discussing the concept of “overlapping consensus on 
international human rights”). 
 95. Yu, supra note 11, at 1072. 
 96. JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 177 (2d ed. 2007). 
 97. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1072–73. 
 98. Jakob Cornides, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Convergence?, 7 J. 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 135, 137 (2004). 
 99. DONNELLY, supra note 63, at 1. 
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property rights. As Professors Helfer and Austin observe: 
Some in the human rights community . . . fear that intellectual 
property owners—in particular, multinational corporations—
will invoke the creators’ rights and property rights provisions 
of international instruments to lock in maximalist intellectual 
property rules that will further concentrate wealth in the hands 
of a few at the expense of the many.
100
 
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc v. Portugal,
101
 for example, the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR extended the coverage of Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1 to the European Convention of Human Rights
102
 to both registered 
trademarks and trademark applications of a multinational corporation. The 
case concerned a dispute over Portugal’s cancellation of a multinational 
brewery’s application for the “Budweiser” trademark in an effort to protect 
the appellation of origin “Budějovický Budvar,” which is owned by 
Budweiser’s longstanding Czech rival.103 Focusing on the right to property, 
the ECtHR considered the term “possessions” to include trademarks and 
trademark applications.
104
 Following this decision, even a faceless 
corporation may receive human rights-like protection for its intellectual 
property. 
The willingness of the ECtHR to extend human rights protection to the 
intellectual property of corporate entities is particularly important to our 
analysis of the human rights implications of TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral 
agreements. To be certain, one could make a strong argument that 
corporations aggregate the disparate human rights interests of individuals, 
such as their individual shareholders. One could also cite to the many 
social benefits created through lawsuits brought by resourceful corporate 
entities on behalf of individuals whose rights have been violated.
105
 
Nevertheless, given the considerable disparity in power between 
transnational corporations and individuals (or even governments 
representing some of these individuals
106
), the tension created by a system 
that allows corporate owners to demand greater human rights protection at 
                                                                                                                     
 100. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 504–05. 
 101. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2007) (Grand Chamber). 
 102. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 103. See Torremans, supra note 26, at 205; Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? 
Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2008).  
 104. See Helfer, supra note 103, at 7–8. 
 105. See Yu, supra note 39, at 728–29. 
 106. See HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 94–95 (2007) (“Corporate power has grown to rival that of states: in 2002 
the corporation with the largest sales figure, Wal-Mart at $217,799m, outdid Austria’s 2002 GDP, 
the twentieth biggest national GDP of the world, and was not that much smaller than the GDP of all 
of Sub-Saharan Africa ($319,288m).” (footnote omitted)). 
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the expense of individuals is inherently troubling. 
 
As a conceptual matter, such an expansive view of human rights is also 
highly problematic. As the CESCR reminds us: 
[O]nly the “author”, namely the creator, whether man or 
woman, individual or group of individuals, of scientific, 
literary or artistic productions, such as, inter alia, writers and 
artists, can be the beneficiary of the protection of article 15, 
paragraph 1(c). . . . Under the existing international treaty 
protection regimes, legal entities are included among the 
holders of intellectual property rights. However, . . . their 
entitlements, because of their different nature, are not 
protected at the level of human rights.
107
 
Likewise, Professor Donnelly declares emphatically, “Collectivities of all 
sorts have many and varied rights. But these are not—cannot be—human 
rights, unless we substantially recast the concept.”108 It is one thing to give 
corporations standing to bring human rights claims on behalf of 
individuals, but quite another to allow corporate owners to claim that “their 
‘human’ rights have [actually] been violated.”109 This Article therefore 
focuses only on individuals; it does not explore the impact of 
nonmultilateral agreements on the human rights-like protection afforded to 
corporate owners that the ECtHR has recently recognized. 
Moreover, if corporate owners have rights, they should also have 
human rights responsibilities.
110
 The lack of such responsibilities is, 
                                                                                                                     
 107. General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 7 (footnote omitted). 
 108. DONNELLY, supra note 63, at 25. 
 109. Yu, supra note 39, at 730. As I noted in an earlier article: 
I consider it acceptable and socially beneficial for a newspaper to bring a human 
rights lawsuit on behalf of its individual readers, whose rights have been violated 
and who may not be able to afford the lawsuit—in terms of either time, energy or 
resources. However, it would be disturbing for that newspaper to claim that its 
human rights have been violated. 
Id. at 730 n.72 (emphasis omitted). 
 110. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 55 (“While only States parties to the 
Covenant are held accountable for compliance with its provisions, they are nevertheless urged to 
consider regulating the responsibility resting on the private business sector, private research 
institutions and other non-State actors to respect the rights recognized in article 15, paragraph 1(c), 
of the Covenant.”); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human 
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 
2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12. 
Rev.2.En?Opendocument [hereinafter Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations] (“Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, 
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indeed, the reason why we need to better balance the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights against international human 
rights commitments. In recent years, international human rights bodies 
have increasingly outlined the vast responsibilities of corporate owners in 
areas implicated by intellectual property protection and enforcement.
111
 
For example, in its authoritative interpretative comment on the right to 
health, the CESCR declares: “While only States are parties to the 
[ICESCR] and thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all 
members of society— . . . including . . . the private business sector—have 
responsibilities regarding the realization of the right to health.”112 The 
preamble to the Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies 
in Relation to Access to Medicines similarly states: “Pharmaceutical 
companies, including innovator, generic and biotechnology companies, 
have human rights responsibilities in relation to access to medicines.”113 
Guideline 26, in particular, stipulates that these companies “should make 
                                                                                                                     
ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, 
including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.”); see also 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion & Prot. of the Right to Freedom of Opinion & Expression, 
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, ¶ 45, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) 
(by Frank La Rue), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session 
/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression] 
(“While States are the duty-bearers for human rights, private actors and business enterprises also 
have a responsibility to respect human rights.”); Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the 
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical & Mental Health, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Physical and Mental Health, at 6–12, transmitted by Note of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/263 (Aug. 11, 2008) (by Paul Hunt), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/G 
EN/N08/456/47/PDF/N0845647.pdf? OpenElement [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on Health] (discussing the “human rights responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies in relation to 
access to medicines”). 
 111. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Health, supra note 110, at 15–25; Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations, supra note 110; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 7–25 (2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf; Overview of the UN Global Compact, U.N. 
GLOBAL COMPACT (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.globalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/ (providing 
information about the U.N. Global Compact, which aims at aligning business initiatives “with [the] 
ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption”). For discussions of the relationship between human rights obligations and private 
actors, see generally ALISON BRYSK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVATE WRONGS: CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL 
CIVIL SOCIETY 117 (2005) ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993); 
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE 
L.J. 443, 475–88 (2001). 
 112. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 
2000). 
 113. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Health, supra note 111, at 15. 
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and respect a public commitment not to lobby for more demanding 
protection of intellectual property interests than those required by TRIPS, 
such as additional limitations on compulsory licensing.”114 
III.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
A.  Compatibilities and Synergies 
Although commentators remain concerned about the adverse impact of 
intellectual property rights on the human rights system, the protection and 
enforcement of those rights can be consistent with a country’s human 
rights commitments. In fact, because some attributes of intellectual 
property rights are protected by international or regional human rights 
instruments, greater protection of those attributes can promote the 
protection of human rights. 
The intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral agreements 
cover a wide variety of intellectual property rights, ranging from copyrights 
to patents and from geographical indications to sui generis database 
protection.
115
 Although an ongoing debate exists concerning whether 
international human rights instruments recognize the right to property
116
 
and whether intellectual property should be identified as personal 
property,
117
 many commentators have equated the protection of intellectual 
property rights with the protection of human rights. 
In Europe, this view is strongly supported by the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention of 
Human Rights.
118
 Intellectual property is also explicitly covered in the 
right to property provision in Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union,
119
 which recently entered into force 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Id. at 21. 
 115. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 1, art. 5(h); Economic Partnership Agreement Between the 
CARIFORUM States, of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States, of the 
Other Part art. 139(3), Oct. 30, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 289/I) 3 [hereinafter EC-CARIFORUM EPA], 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf. 
116. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 15 (“The protection of ‘material interests’ 
of authors in article 15, paragraph 1(c), reflects the close linkage of this provision with the right to 
own property, as recognized in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
regional human rights instruments, as well as with the right of any worker to adequate remuneration 
(art. 7(a)).”); see also Yu, supra note 39, at 731–36 (exploring whether “the right to private 
property already provides adequate protection to the interests in intellectual creations”). 
 117. See Raustiala, supra note 35, at 1032 (warning that “the embrace of [intellectual property] 
by human rights advocates and entities . . . is likely to further entrench some dangerous ideas about 
property: in particular, that property rights as human rights ought to be inviolable and ought to 
receive extremely solicitous attention from the international community”). 
 118. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36, ¶ 78 (2007) (holding that 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to intellectual property as well as the application for 
intellectual property rights if such an application gives rise to proprietary interests). 
 119. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17(2), Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 
O.J. (C 364) 1 (“Intellectual property shall be protected.”). 
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following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.
120
 
Even for those refusing to equate intellectual property rights with 
human rights, the intellectual property provisions do protect important 
human rights attributes of intellectual property rights. To begin with, some 
of these provisions protect the material interests in the creations of 
individual authors and inventors as recognized in international human 
rights instruments.
121
 While not all forms of intellectual property rights 
should be protected at the level of human rights, copyrights and patents 
clearly implicate the material interests of individual authors and 
inventors.
122
 
The intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral agreements also 
offer important protection to the moral interests in the creations of 
individual authors and inventors.
123
 For instance, the provisions on 
copyright and related rights help strengthen the protection of moral rights; 
they ensure proper identification and attribution of the creative work and 
prevent the work from being recoded or otherwise modified in a manner 
that would prejudice the author’s honor or reputation.124 The provisions on 
copyright management information and the requirement that the parties 
ratify the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties
125
 also serve similar purposes.
126
 In 
addition, the provisions on patents help ensure the recognition of 
individual inventors, whose contributions patent grants will 
acknowledge.
127
 
Likewise, the provisions on geographical indications can help 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
became effective on December 1, 2009. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 11, 2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm. 
 121. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 27(2); ICESCR, supra note 28, art. 15(1)(c). 
 122. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1083–92 (discussing the protection of material interests in 
intellectual creations). 
 123. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 2 (“[T]he human right to benefit from the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic 
productions safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations and between peoples, 
communities, or other groups and their collective cultural heritage, as well as their basic material 
interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living.”). 
 124. See, e.g., EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, art. 143. 
 125. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997); WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, at 18 (1997). 
 126. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 1, arts. 27(5)–(8); Dominican Republic–Central America–
United States Free Trade Agreement art. 15.1(2), Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text 
[hereinafter CAFTA-DR]; EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, art. 143(A)(1). 
 127. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 15.9; EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 
115, art. 147; see also Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 4ter (stipulating that “the inventor shall 
have the right to be mentioned as such in the patent”). 
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indigenous peoples and traditional communities obtain the much-needed 
protection of the moral and material interests in their creations.
128
 The 
provisions on the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural 
expressions can also preserve the ways of life and economic and cultural 
heritage of these individuals and communities.
129
 By fostering the 
equitable sharing of benefits, these provisions thereby promote the right to 
self-determination, the right to development, the right to cultural 
participation and development, and the right to the benefits of scientific 
progress of these individuals and communities. As far as biodiversity, 
seeds, plant genetic resources, and traditional agrarian practices are 
concerned, such protection could implicate the rights to adequate food and 
health. 
From the human rights standpoint, the protection of traditional 
knowledge and cultural expressions is rather important. As stated in the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted in September 2007: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect 
and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and 
traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations 
of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human 
and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the 
properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, 
designs, sports and traditional games and visual and 
performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, 
protect and develop their intellectual property over such 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional 
cultural expressions.
130
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 15.3; EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 
115, art. 145; see also Dev Gangjee, Geographical Indications and Human Rights, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 383 (discussing geographical 
indications in relation to the protection of human rights). Nevertheless, the protection of 
geographical indications could also undermine the protection of human rights if the former creates a 
trade barrier by imposing unfair restrictions on the ability of local producers to rename, label, 
remarket, or brand their products. See SISULE F. MUSUNGU, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE EC-CARIFORUM EPA: LESSONS FOR OTHER ACP REGIONS 31 (2009), 
http://www.iqsensato.org/pdf/iqsensato-studies-no-1-full.pdf. 
 129. See, e.g., EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, art. 150; see also HELFER & AUSTIN, 
supra note 12, at 3 (“Some indigenous communities invoke intellectual property rights as vehicles 
for preserving their ways of life and protecting their cultural and economic heritage . . . .”); Peter K. 
Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 433, 471–73 
(2008) (discussing preservation and conservation as the main objectives of the protection for 
cultural heritage). 
 130. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 
31(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (emphasis added). 
28
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/6
2012] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1073 
 
Although the Declaration does not cover intellectual property rights per se, 
the protection of indigenous heritage is likely to have serious ramifications 
for the protection of intellectual property rights. The Declaration’s focus on 
the protection of “cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional 
cultural expressions”131 also echoes provisions in the UDHR, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ICESCR, and 
other international and regional human rights instruments.
132
 
Moreover, nonmultilateral agreements may include abuse of rights 
provisions to promote competition,
133
 which complement other provisions 
related to antitrust or competition law.
134
 They may also include 
technology transfer provisions,
135
 which could promote the protection of 
human rights, in particular the right to the benefits of scientific progress. 
The scope and extent of such protection, however, will depend on how 
serious signatory countries take those obligations. For example, Articles 
66.2 and 67 of the TRIPS Agreement outline the obligations of developed 
countries to promote technology transfer, technical cooperation, and legal 
assistance in developing and least developed countries.
136
 Even though the 
Doha Ministerial Decision of November 14, 2001, reaffirmed the 
                                                                                                                     
 131.  Id. 
 132. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 27(2) (declaring that “everyone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life of the community”); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 19, 1966) (recognizing right of minorities “to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language”); ICESCR, 
supra note 28, art. 15(1)(a) (recognizing right “[t]o take part in cultural life”); Int’l Labour Org., 
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries [No. 169] art. 
15(2), June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M 1382 (“In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral 
or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish 
or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining 
whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting 
any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands. The 
peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall 
receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities.”). 
 133. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 1, art. 27(3); CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 15.1(15); EC-
CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, arts. 97, 111, 128(3), 142(2), 151(2). 
 134. See High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 64 (encouraging “States to consider 
the elaboration of competition laws that prevent abuses of IPRs that lead to violations of the right to 
health—in particular restrictive licensing practices or the setting of high prices for essential drugs”). 
 135. See, e.g., EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, art. 142. 
 136. See TRIPS Agreement art. 66.2 (“Developed country Members shall provide incentives to 
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound 
and viable technological base.”); id. art. 67 (“In order to facilitate the implementation of this 
Agreement, developed country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms 
and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed 
country Members. Such cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and 
regulations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the 
prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the establishment or reinforcement of 
domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel.”). 
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mandatory nature of these obligations,
137
 developed countries thus far have 
failed to take them seriously. 
Finally, if trademark protection in nonmultilateral agreements could be 
extended to cover personality interests, such as those protections found 
under the right of publicity in the United States or personality rights in 
other jurisdictions,
138
 nonmultilateral agreements could provide important 
protection to individuals—especially celebrities—against the unauthorized 
use of their names, likenesses, images, voices, or other personal attributes. 
Such protection may also enhance the protection against privacy intrusions, 
which goes hand in hand with publicity rights.
139
 Although the right to 
privacy is generally not within the scope of intellectual property rights,
140
 
some nonmultilateral agreements, especially those involving the European 
Union, do contain provisions to ensure proper protection of personal data 
and informational privacy.
141
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 137. See World Trade Organization, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns: Decision of 
14 November 2001, ¶ 11.2, WT/MIN(01)/17, 41 I.L.M. 757 (2002) (“[T]he provisions of Article 
66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement are mandatory.”). 
 138. See generally Catherine W. Ng, Some Cultural Narrative Themes and Variations in the 
Common Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 359, 366–70 
(discussing protection against appropriation of personality in common law jurisdictions); Peter K. 
Yu, No Personality Rights for Pop Stars in Hong Kong?, in THE LAW OF REPUTATION AND BRANDS 
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC RIM (Andrew Kenyon et al. eds., forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1672311 [hereinafter Yu, No Personality Rights] (discussing the limited 
protection of personality rights in Hong Kong); Hayley Stallard, The Right of Publicity in the 
United Kingdom, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 565 (1998) (discussing the restricted protection of 
personality rights in the United Kingdom); Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright 
Preemption in Human Audiovisual Characters, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 355, 359–67 (1998) 
(providing an overview of the right of publicity in the United States). 
 139. See Rosina Zapparoni, Propertising Identity: Understanding the United States Right of 
Publicity and Its Implications—Some Lessons for Australia, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 690, 706 (2004) 
(noting “the unique historic relationship of the right of publicity to privacy law in the US” and 
stating that “the right of publicity is, and continues to be, closely aligned with a branch of privacy 
law based on misappropriation”); Yu, No Personality Rights, supra note 138 (stating that “the 
protections of privacy and personality rights can reinforce each other beneficially”). But see Peter 
Jaffey, Privacy, Confidentiality and Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 25, at 447, 464–65 (“The right to prevent the commercial use of one’s public image does 
not relate to private information; indeed the commercial use of a public image does not involve the 
transmission of information at all (unless it is understood as an endorsement). That is not to say that 
such a right is not justified. But it has to be justified on quite different grounds from a right against 
the invasion of informational privacy.”). 
 140. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 1, art. 5(h); EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, art. 
139(3); see also Yu, No Personality Rights, supra note 138 (explaining why no need exists for 
international harmonization in the area of personality or publicity rights). 
 141. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 1, art. 4; CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 15.4(2); EC-
CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, arts. 10, 107, 155(3)(e), 197–201. 
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B.  Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Lost Opportunities 
Although intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral agreements 
can promote the protection of human rights, they can also frustrate such 
protection. Indeed, many commentators believe that these provisions 
would frustrate such protection more than they promote it. The human 
rights impediments created by TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements can 
arise in two different ways: first, directly through the tension created by the 
language of the intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral 
agreements; and second, indirectly through an emphasis on trade, 
economic partnerships, and nonmultilateral approaches that eventually 
divert time, resources, energy, and attention from the further development 
of the international human rights system. This Section discusses direct 
impediments, and the next Section examines indirect impediments. 
At the normative level, direct human rights impediments can take the 
form of conflicts or inconsistencies between TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral 
agreements and international human rights instruments. They can also take 
the form of lost opportunities resulting from the failure of nonmultilateral 
agreements to promote the protection of human rights, even though such 
protection would not create any direct conflict with the intellectual 
property provisions in the agreements.
142
 These lost opportunities were due 
in large part to the misguided and unproven assumption that more 
intellectual property rights are always better.
143
 At times, developed 
countries and their policy makers seek to strengthen the levels of protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights at all costs, without taking 
full account of the many spillover effects in the human rights arena. 
To help us better understand the potential conflicts, inconsistencies, 
and lost opportunities, this Section focuses on three debates in areas where 
intellectual property rights have posed significant challenges to the 
protection of human rights. However, it does not identify each individual 
intellectual property provision in light of the large number of interrelated 
provisions involved and the wide variety of human rights implicated in the 
debates. 
1.  Access to Essential Medicines 
The most widely cited debate concerns the much-needed access to 
essential medicines in less developed countries,
144
 which was impeded by 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See MUSUNGU, supra note 128, at 35. 
 143. See James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0009, at 2–3 (2004), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/ 
2004DLTR0009.pdf (discussing the “maximalist ‘rights culture’” and the resulting loss of balance 
in the intellectual property system). 
 144. For discussions of TRIPS developments in relation to access to medicines, see generally 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 
2006); Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the 
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the strong protection of patents and clinical trial data, as well as heightened 
measures restricting parallel imports while mandating the seizure of in-
transit generic drugs.
145
 This debate has caught the attention of the WTO, 
WIPO, WHO, and other international intergovernmental bodies.
146
 
The debate concerning access to essential medicines implicates both 
the right to life and the right to health. Article 3 of the UDHR explicitly 
provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”147 
Article 25(1) further recognizes that every person has “the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself [or 
herself] and of his [or her] family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services.”148 Echoing this provision, the 
preamble to the WHO Constitution declares: “The enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of 
every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition.”149 While the right to life has arguably 
entered into customary international law, a raging debate continues over 
the legal status of the right to health.
150
 
Regardless of the legal status of the right to health, the AIDS crises in 
less developed countries have led many policy makers, commentators, and 
activists to question the expediency and appropriateness of the existing 
                                                                                                                     
Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005); Peter K. Yu, The International 
Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827 (2007). 
 145.  See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based 
on Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public 
Welfare, 1 WIPO J. 43 (2009) (discussing issues concerning the seizure of in-transit generic drugs 
in Europe); Kaitlin Mara, Drug Seizures in Frankfurt Spark Fears of EU-Wide Pattern, INTELL. 
PROP. WATCH (June 5, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/2009/06/05/drug-seizures-in-frankfurt-
spark-fears-of-eu-wide-pattern/ (reporting about the seizure of generic drugs in Europe). In May 
2010, Brazil and India filed complaints against the European Union and the Netherlands over the 
repeated seizure of in-transit generic drugs. See Request for Consultations by India, European 
Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010); 
Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic 
Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010). A year later, India and the European Union 
reached an interim settlement. India, EU Ink Deal to End Drug Seizure for Now, TIMES OF INDIA 
(July 29, 2011), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-29/india-business/29828750_ 
1_generic-drugs-consignments-of-generic-medicines-eu-parliament. It remains to be seen whether 
India will withdraw its complaint from the WTO and whether Brazil will follow suit. 
 146. See Yu, supra note 75, at 527–29. 
 147. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 3. 
 148. Id. art. 25(1). 
 149. Constitution of the World Health Organization pmbl., recital 2, July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 
2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185. 
 150. See, e.g., HESTERMEYER, supra note 106, at 76–136 (discussing access to medicines as a 
human right); Denis Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching Towards Development in International 
Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 131–33 (discussing the legal status of the right to 
health in relation to the Doha Declaration and the access to medicines debate). 
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intellectual property system.
151
 Indeed, concerns over these crises led WTO 
members to adopt the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health,
152
 which “recognize[d] the gravity of the public health 
problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, 
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics.”153 The document also declared that “the TRIPS Agreement 
does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect 
public health” and that “the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”154 
A few years later, the member states adopted a pioneering protocol to 
formally amend the TRIPS Agreement by adding Article 31bis.
155
 If 
ratified by two-thirds of the WTO membership, the proposed amendment 
will allow countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to 
import generic versions of patented pharmaceuticals. As of this writing, 
more than a third of the 153 WTO member states, including the United 
States, India, Japan, China, and members of the European Union, have 
ratified the proposed amendment.
156
 
Interestingly, some commentators have suggested that the right to 
health can go in the opposite direction. For example, victims of harmful 
diseases can use this right to argue for the need to provide incentives for 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop drugs that treat, prevent, or cure 
the diseases.
157
 Although the intellectual property system provides the 
much-needed incentives for the development of new pharmaceuticals,
158
 
commentators continue to disagree over whether some of these incentives 
can be generated outside the intellectual property system or through other 
                                                                                                                     
 151. See generally THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (Obijiofor Aginam, John Harrington & Peter K. Yu eds., 
forthcoming 2012) (examining the global HIV/AIDS governance regime and the implications of 
high international intellectual property standards for access to essential medicines in developing 
countries). 
 152. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001). 
 153. Id. ¶ 1. 
 154. Id. ¶ 4. 
 155. See General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, at 2, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 
2005); see also Yu, supra note 144, at 872–86 (discussing the proposed Article 31bis of the TRIPS 
Agreement and its origins). 
 156. See Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated Oct. 5, 2012). 
 157. See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman, Theodore and James Pedas Family Professor of Intellectual 
Prop. & Tech. Law, The George Washington Univ. Law Sch., Remarks at the 15th Fordham Annual 
International Intellectual Property and Policy Conference (Apr. 13, 2007). 
 158. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 106–09 (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 49 (2009). 
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funding models, such as grants, subsidies, prizes, advance market 
commitments, reputation gains, open source drug discovery, patent pools, 
public–private partnerships, or equity-based systems built upon liability 
rules.
159
 Such disagreement is understandable, considering that the 
international human rights instruments have not specified a modality of 
protection for interests in intellectual creations.
160
 
There is also an ongoing debate concerning the optimal levels of patent 
protection for less developed countries and whether existing protections 
have already exceeded those levels. As Professor Josh Lerner observes: 
“Almost all economists would agree that some intellectual property 
protection is better than no intellectual property protection at all. But this 
does not mean that very strong protection is better than a more moderate 
level of protection.”161 Noting the problems in the patent systems in many 
developed countries, Professors Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman have 
also called for “[a] moratorium on stronger international intellectual 
property standards.”162 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See, e.g., INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 133–283 (Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 2010) (collecting articles discussing 
prizes, patent pools, and open source drug discovery); GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE 
LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY 
REGIMES (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009) (collecting articles discussing patent pools, 
clearinghouses, open source models, and liability regimes); Yu, supra note 11, at 1088–92 
(discussing the different acceptable modalities of protection that can be used to realize the right to 
the protection of interests in intellectual creations). 
 160. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 10 (“[T]he protection under article 15, 
paragraph 1(c), need not necessarily reflect the level and means of protection found in present 
copyright, patent and other intellectual property regimes, as long as the protection available is 
suited to secure for authors the moral and material interests resulting from their productions . . . .”); 
Yu, supra note 11, at 1089 (“[T]he key criterion for satisfying the material interests obligation is 
not whether the offered protection meets the level of protection required by existing international 
intellectual property agreements or whether such protection is based on the property rights model. 
Rather, one has to inquire whether the existing system provides meaningful protection of material 
interests in the creations by authors and inventors.”). 
 161. Josh Lerner, The Patent System in a Time of Turmoil, 2 WIPO J. 28, 32 (2010). 
 162. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge 
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 36 (Keith E. 
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). As they explain: 
[T]he drive to further harmonize the international minimum standards of patent 
protection at WIPO has occurred at the very time when the domestic standards of 
the United States and the operations of its patent system are under critical 
assault. . . . How, under such circumstances, could it be timely to harmonize and 
elevate international standards of patent protection—even if that were 
demonstrably beneficial—when there is so little agreement in the U.S. itself on 
how to rectify a dysfunctional apparatus that often seems out of 
control? . . . Further harmonization efforts in this climate thus amount to a gamble 
from which bad decisions and bad laws are far more likely to emerge than good 
34
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2.  Access to Knowledge 
A second debate concerns access to information technology, 
communications infrastructure, computer software, electronic databases, 
and digital content. Such access is impeded by the protection of copyrights, 
databases, and technological measures. This debate implicates the rights to 
education and freedom of expression. Because education directly affects 
one’s ability to fully realize oneself,163 the impeded access has troubled 
those adopting the human capabilities or human flourishing approaches to 
human rights.
164
 The issue regarding access to knowledge further ties the 
discussion on intellectual property and human rights to both the older 
debate about the global digital divide
165
 and a much newer one concerning 
access to knowledge.
166
 
Thanks to the Internet and new communications technologies, the 
debate on access to information technology has now caught the attention of 
not only civil liberties groups, but also the United Nations and other 
international intergovernmental organizations. Held in two phases in 
Geneva and Tunis,
167
 the World Summit on the Information Society sought 
to address the concerns raised by the growing digital divide in less 
developed countries and the possibility that these countries might lose out 
                                                                                                                     
laws that appropriately balance public and private interests. 
Id. at 24–26 (footnote omitted). 
 163. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 322 (discussing the connection between 
education and the idea of self-realization); Fons Coomans, In Search of the Core Content of the 
Right to Education, in CORE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 68, at 217, 219 (characterizing the right to 
education as an “‘empowerment’ right”). 
 164. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2821, 2885 (2006) (proposing to integrate a principle of substantive equality “throughout 
intellectual property globalization decision-making via a legal rule akin to the strict scrutiny 
doctrine in U.S. constitutional law”); Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 287–88 (1997) (providing an open-ended working list of the most central 
human capabilities). See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011) (providing a detailed overview of the human capabilities approach 
to development); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH (2000) (discussing the human capabilities approach to human rights in relation to 
women in less developed countries); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 87–110 (1999) 
(outlining the human flourishing approach to development).  
 165. See generally Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 
20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the global digital divide). 
 166. For discussions of the access to knowledge debate, see generally ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 
IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010); Amy 
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 
117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008). 
 167. See Yu, supra note 75, at 537–38 (discussing the World Summit on the Information 
Society and developments in the emerging information and communications regime); see also 
World Summit on the Information Society, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/wsis/index. 
html (last updated Nov. 17, 2011) (providing information about the World Summit). 
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on many unprecedented opportunities generated by the information 
revolution.
168
 This summit led to the launch of the Internet Governance 
Forum (IGF), which was created to promote a “multilateral, multi-
stakeholder, democratic and transparent” policy dialogue on Internet 
governance.
169
 IGF meetings have since convened in Athens, Rio de 
Janeiro, Hyderabad, Sharm El Sheikh, Vilnius, and Nairobi.
170
 
In recent years, the adoption of the graduated response system
171
 has 
elicited strong criticisms in the human rights arena.
172
 Of primary concern 
are the human rights implications of Internet disconnection, the system’s 
final option. From the human rights standpoint, using suspension or 
termination of Internet service as a remedy for alleged copyright 
infringement is highly problematic. As Frank La Rue, the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, declared in his recent report: 
The Special Rapporteur considers cutting off users from 
Internet access, regardless of the justification provided, 
including on the grounds of violating intellectual property 
rights law, to be disproportionate and thus a violation of 
Article 19, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
The Special Rapporteur [further] calls upon all States to 
ensure that Internet access is maintained at all times, 
including during times of political unrest. In particular, the 
Special Rapporteur urges States to repeal or amend existing 
intellectual copyright laws which permit users to be 
disconnected from Internet access, and to refrain from 
adopting such laws.
173
 
The Special Rapporteur’s concern and request are understandable. 
After all, repressive governments have recruited Internet service providers 
to serve as gatekeepers to help censor digital content and restrict 
                                                                                                                     
 168. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Trust and Distrust of Intellectual Property Rights, 18 
REVUE QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT INT’L 107 (2005) (discussing intellectual property issues raised at the 
World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva). 
 169. Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], World Summit on the Info. Soc’y, Tunis Agenda for the 
Information Society, ¶¶ 72–73, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005), available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html. 
 170. See INTERNET GOVERNANCE F., http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/ (last visited Feb. 2, 
2012) (providing information about the Internet Governance Forum); see also Molly Beutz Land, 
Protecting Rights Online, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 32–38 (2009) (discussing the Internet Governance 
Forum in the context of human rights and access to knowledge). 
 171. See supra Part I. 
 172. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, supra note 110, 
¶¶ 78–79. 
 173. Id. ¶¶ 78–79. 
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information flows.
174
 While the graduated response system protects 
intellectual property rights holders, as opposed to governments, its impact 
on individual freedom of expression is not that different from the impact of 
government censorship.
175
 
Indeed, as I have pointed out elsewhere, developed countries’ 
increasing push for draconian measures to respond to enforcement 
problems in the digital environment has slowly backfired on their 
longstanding interests in promoting free speech, free press, human rights, 
and civil liberties abroad.
176
 From the human rights standpoint, provisions 
                                                                                                                     
 174. See Yu, supra note 46, at 715 (noting the free speech concerns raised by the proposal in 
Hong Kong’s digital copyright reform to introduce a streamlined procedure to obtain users’ 
information for the facilitation of copyright infringement actions); Yu, supra note 59, at 1402 
(discussing how the graduated response system would undermine the protection of free speech, free 
press, and privacy). See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, 
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006) 
(discussing how private actors have been enlisted as “proxy censors” to control the flow of 
information). 
It is worth noting that the use of Internet service providers as gatekeepers to help censor digital 
content and restrict information flows is not limited to repressive governments. Many democracies 
in the developed world engage in such use. See Rebecca MacKinnon, The Green Dam 
Phenomenon, WALL ST. J. ASIA, June 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12452599205102 
3961.html (“The Internet censorship club is expanding and now includes a growing number of 
democracies. Legislators are under growing pressure from family groups to ‘do something’ in the 
face of all the threats sloshing around the Internet, and the risk of overstepping is high.”); see also 
REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET 
FREEDOM 101 (2012) (“[P]oliticians throughout the democratic world are pushing for stronger 
censorship and surveillance by Internet companies to stop the theft of intellectual property. They are 
doing so in response to aggressive lobbying by powerful corporate constituents without adequate 
consideration of the consequences for civil liberties, and for democracy more broadly.”); 
Christopher Rhoads & Loretta Chao, Iran’s Web Spying Aided by Western Technology, WALL ST. 
J., June 22, 2009, at A1 (discussing Internet control in Britain, Germany, United States, and 
Australia); Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/government 
requests/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) (providing the Google transparency report). 
 175. See Yu, supra note 59, at 1374 (noting that the graduated response system involves 
mostly private censorship, as opposed to state censorship). 
 176. As I have noted before: 
Today, the entertainment industry’s aggressive push for stronger copyright 
protection and enforcement has caused serious collateral damages to society at 
large, eroding the protections of free speech, free press, privacy, due process, and 
other civil liberties. The proposed ACTA, for example, calls for draconian 
measures that threaten to undermine the United States’ longstanding interests in 
promoting human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law abroad. Likewise, the 
push for the worldwide adoption of the graduated response system has undermined 
the protections of free speech, free press, privacy, and both procedural and 
substantive due process. In addition, the introduction of anti-circumvention laws 
and the ongoing push for greater protection of digital rights management tools 
have brought about many unintended consequences, chilling innovation and 
competition while raising concerns over free speech, privacy, consumer 
protection, academic freedom, learning, scientific advancement, cultural 
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that call for Internet disconnection, greater intermediary liability for 
Internet service providers, and tougher criminal penalties for unauthorized 
dissemination of online content have raised very serious concerns.
177
 
3.  Global Climate Change 
The final debate concerns the role of the intellectual property system in 
response to challenges posed by global climate change.
178
 As the debate 
has emerged only recently, it is unclear what rights will be implicated, 
what limitations and exceptions will be introduced, and how and whether 
the overall intellectual property system will be changed. Indeed, the rights 
involved are more likely to be covered in the category of lost opportunities 
than in the category of conflicts or inconsistencies. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the debate will implicate such 
important human rights as the rights to health, adequate housing, adequate 
food, water, and development.
179
 Because of the asymmetry in resource 
endowment, less developed countries with significant populations and 
resources in areas vulnerable to floods, hurricanes, typhoons, tsunamis, 
severe drought, desertification, or forest decay will likely suffer more than 
others if the intellectual property system is not better managed to respond 
to climate change. 
 
                                                                                                                     
development, and democratic discourse. 
Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 928–
29 (2011) (footnotes omitted); see also Robert S. Rogoyski & Kenneth Basin, The Bloody Case that 
Started from a Parody: American Intellectual Property and the Pursuit of Democratic Ideals in 
Modern China, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 237, 254–59 (2009) (discussing the damage to free speech 
wrought by overreaching copyright protection); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting 
Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 174 (2000) (“By 
demonstrating that a country should rely heavily on pressure and ultimata to protect its economic 
interests, the existing foreign intellectual property policy backfires and jeopardizes the United 
States’s longstanding interests in promoting human rights and civil liberties in China. It also 
discredits the very important message that one should respect rights and the legal process.”). 
 177. For critiques of these provisions, see generally Yu, supra note 46, at 701–16 (examining 
provisions creating criminal liability for the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works and 
concerning Internet service providers); Yu, supra note 59, at 1390–1403 (discussing the drawbacks 
of the graduated response system). 
 178. For discussions of the relationship between intellectual property rights and global climate 
change, see generally ERIC L. LANE, CLEAN TECH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011); MATTHEW 
RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2011); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Joshua Sarnoff ed., forthcoming 2012). 
 179. See MARCOS A. ORELLANA ET AL., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE UNFCCC AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES: THE CHALLENGE OF SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/181/138_technology_transfer_UNFCCC.pdf. 
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C.  Systemic Tension and Indirect Impediments 
In addition to the above conflicts and inconsistencies, the intellectual 
property provisions in nonmultilateral agreements have created 
considerable tension between the intellectual property and human rights 
systems. Even in areas where no direct conflicts or inconsistencies arise, 
the agreements could distort the work of the international human rights 
system by creating an undue emphasis on trade, economic partnerships, 
and nonmultilateral approaches. They could also divert time, resources, 
energy, and attention from the further development of the international 
human rights system. 
1.  Intellectual Property v. Human Rights 
Compared with the intellectual property system, the human rights 
system has a distinctive culture, language, and forum structure, as well as 
drastically different approaches to negotiation and conflict resolution.
180
 
The position human rights advocates take often do not coincide with those 
taken by intellectual property rights holders and their supportive 
governments.
181
 The latter’s views are often colored by the trade-based—
                                                                                                                     
 180. As Professors Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin explain: 
Intellectual property commentators, especially those working in the Anglo-
American tradition, employ the analytical tools of utilitarianism and welfare 
economics to evaluate the trade-offs between incentives and access and the 
consequences for the individuals and firms that create, own, and consume 
intellectual property products. The international human rights movement, by 
contrast, engages in a discourse of absolutes that seeks to delineate the negative 
and positive duties of states to respect and promote inalienable individual 
freedoms. As a result, to label something as a “human right” often invokes—in 
rhetoric if not always in reality—a language of trumps and unconditional 
demands. This emphasis on categorical rights and responsibilities appears ill 
suited to the rapidly changing technological and economic environment in which 
intellectual property rules operate, an environment that often engenders calls for 
incremental recalibrations of the balance between incentives and access. 
HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 504; see also Land, supra note 170, at 1–2 (“Those in the 
human rights movement are largely international lawyers, while the A2K movement is 
predominantly composed of cyberlaw and intellectual property lawyers and technologists.”); 
Audrey Chapman, A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual Property, Scientific Progress, and 
Access to the Benefits of Science, in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PUB. NO. 762(E), 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 127, 128 (1998) (“Intellectual property lawyers tend 
to have little involvement with human rights law, and few human rights specialists deal with science 
and technology or intellectual property issues.”); Yu, supra note 11, at 1136 (noting that 
transnational corporations “often find alien the human rights language and the forum structure”). 
 181. See Gervais, supra note 25, at 22 (“The response of the industry and the United States 
Government thus far . . . point[] to additional trade-enforced restrictions on existing flexibilities that 
would be successful in maintaining maximum protection and limiting access to products . . . sold by 
the patent holder, but at a potentially high human and ethical cost. This seems like suboptimal 
cohabitation [of intellectual property and human rights].”). 
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and at times, trade-only—approach developed through the founding of the 
WTO and the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. It is therefore no surprise 
that commentators have heavily criticized the WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body for failing to protect important human rights.
182
 
Indeed, the tension between the WTO and the international human 
rights system has led U.N. human rights bodies to heavily criticize the 
TRIPS Agreement. For example, in Resolution 2000/7, the U.N. Sub-
Commission stated that “the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does 
not adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all 
human rights.”183 Noting the “apparent conflicts between the intellectual 
property rights regime embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one 
hand, and international human rights law, on the other,”184 the Sub-
Commission underscored the “social function of intellectual property”185 
and reminded governments of “the primacy of human rights obligations 
over economic policies and agreements.”186 The resolution also requested 
“[g]overnments and national, regional and international economic policy 
forums to take international human rights obligations and principles fully 
into account in international economic policy formulation.”187 
Likewise, Mary Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, released a report highly critical of the TRIPS Agreement.
188
 The 
report provided five observations concerning the potential challenge for 
developing a human rights approach to the Agreement. First, the High 
Commissioner noted: 
 
                                                                                                                     
 182. See Tomer Broude, It’s Easily Done: The China—Intellectual Property Rights 
Enforcement Dispute and the Freedom of Expression, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 660, 661 (2010) 
(arguing that “contrary to any prior expectations of spontaneous confluence between trade, 
intellectual property and human rights, the reasoning of [the WTO panel report on China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights] is entirely 
oblivious to the human rights implications of the dispute, and that it could even have negative 
effects on the legal framework of the freedom of expression in China”); see also Robert Howse, The 
Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 493, 496 (2000) (criticizing the WTO Panel for being “only interested in how much 
the rights holder might lose, not in how much society might gain, from a given exception”); Ruth L. 
Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 819, 914–15 (2003) (expressing disappointment that WTO panels, despite focusing 
on the purpose and objective of the TRIPS Agreement and the context of the negotiations, “have 
interpreted the provisions almost solely in light of the economic expectations of the private right 
holders”). 
 183. Resolution 2000/7, supra note 20, ¶ 2. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. ¶ 5. 
 186. Id. ¶ 3. 
 187. Id. ¶ 4. 
 188. High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 2. 
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[T]he overall thrust of the TRIPS Agreement is the promotion 
of innovation through the provision of commercial incentives. 
The various links with the subject matter of human rights—
the promotion of public health, nutrition, environment and 
development—are generally expressed in terms of exceptions 
to the rule rather than the guiding principles themselves and 
are made subject to the provisions of the Agreement.
189
 
Second, “while the Agreement identifies the need to balance rights 
with obligations, it gives no guidance on how to achieve this balance.”190 
Although the TRIPS Agreement “sets out in considerable detail the content 
of intellectual property rights”—such as the requirements for the grant of 
rights, the duration of protection, and the modes of enforcement—it “only 
alludes to the responsibilities of [intellectual property] holders that should 
balance those rights in accordance with its own objectives. . . . [U]nlike the 
rights it sets out, the Agreement does not establish the content of these 
responsibilities, or how they should be implemented.”191 
Third, because of the required minimum standards, the TRIPS 
Agreement has taken away a high degree of autonomy and a considerable 
amount of policy space from the WTO member states. The lack of such 
autonomy, in turn, may affect their “abilities to promote and protect human 
rights, including the right to development.”192 As the High Commissioner 
reminded us, Article 2(3) of the Declaration on the Right to Development 
provides: 
States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate 
national development policies that aim at the constant 
improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of 
all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and 
meaningful participation in development and in the fair 
distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom.
193
 
A fourth concern, related to the third, is that “the protection contained 
in the TRIPS Agreement focuses on forms of protection that have 
                                                                                                                     
 189. Id. ¶ 22; see also Sisule F. Musungu, Rethinking Innovation, Development and 
Intellectual Property in the UN: WIPO and Beyond 4–5 (Quaker Int’l Affairs Programme, Ottawa, 
TRIPS Issues Paper No. 5, 2005), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/ 
TRIPS53.pdf (“So far the only widely accepted notion has been that intellectual property is trade-
related, justifying the TRIPS Agreement in the WTO but not the notion that intellectual property 
rules are also education-related, health-related, defence-related and environment-related and so 
forth.”). 
 190. High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 23. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. ¶ 24. 
 193. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 74, art. 2(3). 
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developed in industrialized countries.”194 As a result, less developed 
countries are required to offer protection that does not always take account 
of local needs, interests, and conditions. Even worse, such protection may 
significantly reduce a country’s ability to promote public health or 
participation in development. 
Finally, under the current international intellectual property system, 
limited attention has been devoted to the protection of “the cultural 
heritage and technology of local communities and indigenous peoples.”195 
There are also growing concerns about the use of trade pressure to impose 
TRIPS-plus legislation that could result in the development of “IP systems 
that are inconsistent with States’ responsibilities under human rights 
law.”196 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the High Commissioner recognized 
the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement and noted that “much still 
depends on how the . . . Agreement is actually implemented.”197 While 
these flexibilities are important and may help retain the balance in the 
international intellectual property system, it is important to remember that 
countries need expertise and resources to take advantage of these 
flexibilities. As UNCTAD reminded us in The Least Developed Countries 
Report 2007: 
Even with its inbuilt flexibilities, the TRIPS Agreement is 
highly problematic for [least developed countries] owing to 
the high transaction costs involved in complex and 
burdensome procedural requirements for implementing and 
enforcing appropriate national legal provisions. [These 
countries] generally lack the relevant expertise and the 
administrative capacity to implement them.
198
 
In sum, as shown in the U.N. Sub-Commission’s and High 
Commissioner’s analyses of the human rights impact of the TRIPS 
Agreement, obligations in international intellectual property agreements—
including nonmultilateral agreements—could create tension between the 
intellectual property system and the human rights system. Even if tension 
does not exist on the surface, the obligations could mismatch the adopted 
                                                                                                                     
 194. High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 25. 
 195. Id. ¶ 26. 
 196. Id. ¶ 27. 
 197. Id. ¶ 28. 
 198. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], The Least Developed Countries Report 
2007: Knowledge, Technological Learning and Innovation for Development, at 99, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/LDC/2007 (2007); accord Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II: Should Users 
Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 25 (2004) (noting that many less developed countries lack 
“experience with intellectual property protection [and] sufficient human capital (in the form of legal 
talent) to codify wiggles into law”). 
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standards and local conditions.
199
 They could also divert the scarce 
economic resources from other important public needs. Such diversion is 
particularly likely in the enforcement area.
200
 
2.  Bi/Plurilateral v. Multilateral 
Although nonmultilateral agreements have created significant tension 
between the intellectual property system and the human rights system, the 
bilateral and plurilateral approaches used to establish these agreements 
have raised additional concerns. By going outside the multilateral system, 
nonmultilateral agreements have undermined the existing multilateral 
approach to international norm-setting in both the intellectual property and 
human rights arenas.
201
 
As commentators have widely recognized, the development of the 
highly controversial ACTA, the equally problematic TPP, and other 
TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements is not only an effort to strengthen 
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, but also an 
                                                                                                                     
 199. See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 
42–50 (2006) (discussing the mismatch between the anticircumvention regime and the local 
conditions of less developed countries); Yu, supra note 144, at 889–91 (discussing the mismatch 
between the TRIPS Agreement and the local conditions of less developed countries). 
 200. See Carsten Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Perspective, in 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, ISSUE PAPER NO. 22, THE 
GLOBAL DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES xiii, 2 (2009) (“Governments need to make choices about how many resources to spend 
on combating piracy, as opposed to enforcing other areas of law, building roads and bridges, 
protecting national security, and providing other public goods. Such choices are usually not stated 
in explicit terms, but they underlie every budgetary decision by federal and local governments.”); 
see also Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa, Towards a Development Approach on IP Enforcement: 
Conclusions and Strategic Recommendations, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 207, 210 (Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT] (noting that the demands for strengthened intellectual 
property enforcement “seem to overlook the cost of the required actions, the different priorities that 
exist in developing countries regarding the use of public funds (health and education would 
normally be regarded as more urgent than IP enforcement) and the crucial fact that IPRs are private 
rights and, hence, the burden and cost of their enforcement is to be borne by the right-holder, not 
the public at large”); MUSUNGU, supra note 128, at 61 (“African and Pacific countries, learning 
from the example of the CARIFORUM EPA, should approach proposals for additional obligations 
on IP issues in their regions with utmost caution. Even in cases where the issues addressed have the 
potential of development benefits, the overall obligations assumed may be too onerous for these 
countries. This is the case, for example, with respect to the provisions on enforcement and on the 
protection of geographical indications.”); Xue Hong, Enforcement for Development: Why Not an 
Agenda for the Developing World?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra, at 133, 143 
(“Increment and strength of public enforcement measures will inevitably impose an economic 
burden on the developing countries and divert the priorities of these countries, such as prosecution 
of violent crimes or relief of poverty.”); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 
WIPO J. 1, 2–6 (2010) (discussing the costs of strong intellectual property enforcement norms and 
the resulting trade-offs). 
 201. See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 976–77. 
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indictment of the deficiencies in the TRIPS Agreement and the multilateral 
approach used in completing the WTO rounds of trade negotiations.
202
 By 
changing countries’ preferences for multilateral approaches, the 
establishment of nonmultilateral agreements has therefore posed 
significant challenges to the stability of both the international trading 
system and the international human rights system.
203
 These bilateral and 
plurilateral negotiations may further alienate a country’s trading partners, 
making it more difficult for the country to undertake multilateral 
discussions in the future.
204
 
Even worse, by fragmenting the international regulatory system and 
creating what Professor Jagdish Bhagwati and other commentators have 
described as the “spaghetti bowl”205 or the “noodle bowl,”206 the continued 
                                                                                                                     
 202. See Jeffery Atik, ACTA and the Destabilization of TRIPS, in SUSTAINABLE TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER: A GUIDE TO GLOBAL AID & TRADE DEVELOPMENT (121, 145 Hans Henrik Lidgard et al. 
eds., 2012) (“ACTA is a critique of TRIPS—its very core signals a diagnosis that TRIPS 
inadequately addressed the problem of IP enforcement.”); Yu, supra note 57, at 511–14 (noting that 
ACTA was created in part to address the inadequacies and ineffectiveness of the TRIPS 
enforcement provisions); Catherine Saez, ACTA a Sign of Weakness in Multilateral System, WIPO 
Head Says, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 30, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/ 
2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-multilateral-system-wipo-head-says/ (reporting the concern 
of WIPO Director General Francis Gurry that countries are “taking matters into their own hands to 
seek solutions outside of the multilateral system to the detriment of inclusiveness of the present 
system”). See generally Yu, supra note 57 (providing a comprehensive discussion of why the 
TRIPS enforcement provisions are inadequate and ineffective from the standpoint of developed 
countries and intellectual property rights holders). 
 203. Cf. Chad Damro, The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 23, 39–41 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino 
eds., 2006) (discussing how regional trade agreements can serve as “political stumbling blocks” to 
WTO multilateralism); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 976 (noting that 
nonmultilateral agreements “threaten to undermine the existing multilateral system”). 
 204. See Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 239 (2004) (“The inherent 
discriminatory nature of bilateralism/regionalism is often blended with an internal power disparity 
and ultimately begets unilateralism. Unilateralism, which is often clad with extraterritoriality, tends 
to eclipse international trade law, thereby placing the global trading system at the mercy of bare 
politics by a handful of powerful states.”); Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States 
Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 297 (1991) 
(arguing that bilateral agreements “may run counter to U.S. long-term interests for a healthy, stable 
trade environment . . . [and] fragment the world trading system . . . [by creating] resentment, 
particularly among Third World countries who view imposed bilateral agreements as a species of 
colonialism”); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 976 (noting that nonmultilateral 
agreements can “alienate a country’s multilateral partners, resulting in distractions, or even 
disengagement, that impede the progress of multilateral discussions”). 
 205. Jagdish Bhagwati, US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in THE 
DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 2–3 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne O. 
Krueger eds., 1995); see also Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 978 & n.107 (noting the 
creation of a “noodle bowl” in Asia). 
 206. See Wang Jiangyu, Association of Southeast Asian Nations–China Free Trade 
Agreement, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 192, 224 (noting 
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push for TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements has forced countries to 
divert scarce time, resources, energy, and attention from other international 
intergovernmental initiatives, including the development of the 
international human rights system.
207
 In less developed countries where 
resources are scarce and personnel dedicated to the negotiation of 
international human rights instruments may overlap with those involved in 
the development of international intellectual property agreements, the 
negotiation of nonmultilateral agreements will inevitably deplete resources 
that can otherwise be used to strengthen human rights protection. 
It is important to remember that not every country has the ability to 
undertake discussions in a multitude of fora—in this case, in both 
intellectual property and human rights fora and in both multilateral and 
nonmultilateral fora. Even the United States or the European Union could 
not devote the same amount of time, energy, and attention to the 
multilateral process had it been asked to negotiate a large number of 
bilateral and plurilateral agreements alongside the ongoing multilateral 
negotiations.
208
 With significantly more limited resources, less developed 
                                                                                                                     
“‘Asian noodle bowl effect’ as highlighted by officials of the Asian Development Bank”); Yu, Sinic 
Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 978 (noting the creation of the “noodle bowl” or “curry bowl” 
in Asia); Richard E. Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism 
(Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper on Regional Economic Integration No. 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.adb.org/documents/papers/regional-economic-integration/WP07-Baldwin.pdf; Masahiro 
Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian FTAs: Trends and Challenges 3 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working 
Paper No. 144, 2009), available at http://www.adb.org/documents/Working-Papers/2010/ 
Economics-WP226.pdf (noting “a ‘noodle bowl’ problem of criss-crossing agreements that 
potentially distort trade toward bilateral channels, excessive exclusions and special treatment in 
FTAs, and the possibility that the multilateral trading system may be progressively eroded”). 
 207. As I noted in an earlier article: 
In an ideal world, both the multilateral and bilateral processes should work in 
tandem to maximize their strengths and effectiveness. Countries, therefore, should 
continue to negotiate in a multilateral forum while at the same time seeking 
enhancement through FTAs and EPAs. In reality, however, countries—especially 
those in the less-developed world—have very limited resources. As a result, they 
may not have the ability to dedicate efforts to normmaking in a multitude of 
competing fora. Not even developed countries can devote the same amount of 
energy and resources to the multilateral process if they also have to negotiate a 
large number of bilateral and plurilateral agreements. 
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 977 (footnote omitted); see also Renato Ruggiero, 
Comment, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 25, 26–27 (Jeffrey J. Schott 
ed., 2004) [hereinafter FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS] (“Negotiating bilateral and regional agreements 
can divert attention and effort from the Doha Round. This in turn can create a vicious cycle, 
whereby a lack of progress at the WTO spurs a greater emphasis on bilateralism and regionalism, 
which in turn further hampers efforts in Geneva.”). 
 208. See European Comm’n, Directorate-General for Trade, Strategy for the Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries, 2005 O.J. (C 129) 3, 5 (“It is important to identify a 
limited number of countries on which the efforts of the Commission in the framework of the present 
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countries most certainly would do much worse. 
Moreover, as Professors Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs 
insightfully observe, the growing proliferation of international regulatory 
institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries could 
help powerful countries preserve their dominance in the international 
arena.
209
 The growing complexities could also result in what Professor Kal 
Raustiala describes as “strategic inconsistenc[ies],” which help alter, 
undermine, or put pressure on unfavorable norms in the international 
human rights system.
210
 Such complexities could further upset the existing 
coalition dynamics between international actors and institutions, thereby 
threatening to reduce the bargaining power and influence less developed 
                                                                                                                     
strategy should be concentrated. The human and financial resources allocated to the enforcement of 
IPR being limited, it is unrealistic to pretend that our action can extend equally to all, or even most, 
of the countries where piracy and counterfeiting occur.” (citation and footnote omitted)); Jeffrey J. 
Schott, Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading System?, in FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS, supra note 207, at 3, 16 (pointing out that resource scarcity equally “affects US 
negotiators, whose budget is inadequate to meet the extensive demands set out in US Trade 
Promotion Authority by their congressional masters”); see also id. (“If WTO talks face tough 
sledding, [FTA critics’] counsel is to redouble efforts at most favored nation reforms rather than to 
create new distortions via competing preferential regimes.”); Richard N. Cooper, Comment, in FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 207, at 20, 23 (“The United States ought to devote its negotiating 
and political energies to getting a successful conclusion to the multilateral negotiations, currently 
the Doha Round and some unfinished business from the Uruguay Round.”); Damro, supra note 
203, at 42 (noting that multilateral liberalization could slow down “as governments shift attention 
and resources toward the negotiation of regional agreements”). 
 209. Professors Benvenisti and Downs describe three ways in which the growing proliferation 
of international regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries has 
helped powerful states preserve their dominance: 
First, [fragmentation] limits the ability of weaker states to engage in the logrolling 
that is necessary for them to bargain more effectively with more powerful 
states. . . . Second, by creating a multitude of competing institutions with 
overlapping responsibilities, fragmentation provides powerful states with the 
opportunity to abandon—or threaten to abandon—any given venue for a more 
sympathetic venue if their demands are not met. . . . Third, a fragmented system’s 
piecemeal character suggests an absence of design and obscures the role of 
intentionality. . . . This has helped obscure the fact that fragmentation is in part the 
result of a calculated strategy by powerful states to create a legal order that both 
closely reflects their interests and that only they have the capacity to alter. 
Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the 
Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 597–98 (2007). 
 210. See Raustiala, supra note 35, at 1027–28 (stating that strategic inconsistencies “‘occur[] 
when actors deliberately seek to create inconsistency via a new rule crafted in another forum in an 
effort to alter or put pressure on an earlier rule’”); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 979 
(“The more bilateral and plurilateral agreements there are, the more opportunities there will be for 
powerful and geopolitically savvy countries to develop such inconsistencies.”); see also Laurence 
R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 14 (2004) (discussing legal inconsistencies generated 
by development of counter-regime norms). 
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countries have obtained through past coalition-building initiatives.
211
 
IV.  RECONCILIATION AND ADJUSTMENTS 
To reconcile the conflicts and inconsistencies, and to alleviate the 
tensions, between the intellectual property system and the human rights 
system, this Part proposes two different sets of adjustments. The first set 
focuses on the normative challenges identified in Part III.B. The second set 
responds to the systemic challenges discussed in Part III.C. 
A.  Normative Adjustments 
As discussed earlier, some attributes of intellectual property rights are 
protected by international human rights instruments. A satisfactory 
resolution of the tension between the intellectual property and human 
rights systems therefore requires a careful delineation of the different 
attributes of intellectual property rights.
212
 After all, the CESCR stated 
clearly that, “[i]n contrast to human rights, intellectual property rights are 
generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned 
to someone else.”213 
From the human rights standpoint, there are two different types of 
conflicts: external and internal.
214
 External conflicts arise at the 
intersection between human rights and the non-human rights aspects of 
intellectual property protection. Internal conflicts, by contrast, arise at the 
intersection between rights protecting the human rights attributes of 
intellectual property and other forms of human rights. These conflicts take 
place within the human rights system even though they also implicate 
intellectual property protection. 
                                                                                                                     
 211. See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of 
Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 315, 373 (2003) (“[T]o the extent regime shifting upsets coalitional dynamics between 
developing countries, the loss on the development side is actually doubled. Not only is there a 
dilution of a normative proposition, however subtle, but there is also the political loss resulting 
from splinters between developing countries whose membership in various regimes may be 
different, or whose position on issues within the regimes may differ.”); see also Yu, supra note 14, 
at 17–18 (discussing how “the increased complexity of the international intellectual property regime 
has upset existing coalition dynamics between actors and institutions within the regime complex”); 
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 981 (“[B]y taking away these countries’ ability to 
form coalitions, FTAs and EPAs have generally made less-developed countries more vulnerable 
than in a multilateral setting.” (footnote omitted)). 
 212. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1128. 
 213. General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 2. 
 214. In addition to these two sets of conflicts, which are true conflicts, it is also worth noting 
the possibilities for false conflicts (similar to those identified by conflict of law scholars). One 
commentator, for example, contends that market failures can precipitate false conflicts. See Sharon 
E. Foster, The Conflict Between the Human Right to Education and Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 287, 305–06. 
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1.  External Conflicts 
With respect to external conflicts, countries can consider the 
introduction of limitations and exceptions either within the intellectual 
property system or without. Such limitations and exceptions are consistent 
with the existing international human rights instruments. Article 4 of the 
ICESCR provides: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in 
the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in 
conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject 
such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law 
only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of 
these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare in a democratic society.
215
 
Article 25 further states: “Nothing in the present Covenant shall be 
interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and 
utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.”216 
Externally, countries can embrace the principle of human rights 
primacy that the U.N. Sub-Commission outlined in Resolution 2000/7.
217
 
In the event of a conflict between intellectual property rights and human 
rights, countries can ensure proper protection of human rights by using 
certain human rights to preempt intellectual property rights. For example, 
the rights to life and health can be used to safeguard against the over-
protection of pharmaceutical patents or clinical trial data.
218
 To some 
extent, greater utilization of the human rights system may help less 
developed countries uphold the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement. Such 
utilization may also allow these countries to “claw back” some of the 
concessions they made during the TRIPS negotiations.
219
 
                                                                                                                     
 215. ICESCR, supra note 28, art. 4; see also UDHR, supra note 32, art. 29(2) (“In the exercise 
of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by 
law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society.”). 
 216. ICESCR, supra note 28, art. 25. 
 217. See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 20, ¶¶ 2, 3 (reminding governments “of the primacy of 
human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements” and the importance of other 
human rights, such as the right to food and the right to health); Yu, supra note 11, at 1092–93 
(discussing the principle of human rights primacy). 
 218. Given their lack of basis in human rights instruments, rights in clinical trial data will be 
more easily preempted by human rights than patent rights, which contain at least some human rights 
attributes. See supra Part III.A. 
 219. See Raustiala, supra note 35, at 1036 (“[T]here are significant efforts to use human rights 
instruments and concepts to roll back some of the more egregious elements of TRIPS.”); cf. 
JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 
(2001) (suggesting that a constructive resolution of ambiguities in the TRIPS Agreement may 
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Nevertheless, authors, inventors, and their corporate owners may abuse 
the human rights system. “Because those attributes or forms of intellectual 
property rights that do not have a human rights basis are likely to be 
deemed less important through a human rights lens,”220 without proper 
safeguards, preemption based on the principle of human rights primacy 
could significantly reduce the incentives generated by the existing 
intellectual property system. As Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss 
cautions: 
Elevating intellectual property rights to human rights has 
unfortunate pragmatic consequences. Presumably, human 
rights can be outweighed only by other human rights. 
Accordingly, under a human rights approach, the benefit 
stream flowing from inventive production can be distributed, 
without a patentee’s authorization, only to meet social needs 
that are likewise classified as fundamental. (Or to put it 
another way, every incursion on a patent right would need to 
be justified by showing that it involved an interest that is not 
only socially desirable, but that can also be categorized as a 
human right.) Instead of relying on legislatures and courts to 
wield well-understood tools embedded in existing patent law, 
ad hoc rights-balancing leads to unpredictable decision-
making. The result, ironically, is an environment less 
conducive to decisions to invest time and money in 
intellectual efforts. The new—human rights—justification 
can, in short, thwart the traditional—utilitarian—goal of 
limiting protection from free riders as a means of encouraging 
the advancement of knowledge.
221
 
Internally, countries can also proactively introduce limitations and 
exceptions into the intellectual property system. In the area of access to 
essential medicines, for example, countries can introduce provisions that 
facilitate compulsory licensing, parallel importation, or government use.
222
 
They can also introduce exemptions from patent protection for early 
working, research, and development of diagnostics,
223
 or provisions 
                                                                                                                     
provide less developed countries with a “means of ‘clawing’ back much of what was lost in the 
negotiating battles in TRIPS”). 
 220. See Yu, supra note 39, at 712. 
 221. Dreyfuss, supra note 78, at 74. 
 222. See generally HESTERMEYER, supra note 106, at 229–55 (discussing TRIPS flexibilities in 
relation to the protection of human rights); ELLEN F.M. ‘T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION 
OF THE WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 39–59 (2009) (discussing 
compulsory licenses and parallel importation in relation to flexibilities under the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
 223. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
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facilitating the production, importation, or use of generic substitutes.
224
 In 
addition, as the CESCR suggested, countries can introduce complementary 
measures to improve access to essential medicines “through the exchange 
of price information, price competition and price negotiation with public 
procurement and insurance schemes, price controls, reduced duties and 
taxes and improved distribution efficiency, reduced distribution and 
dispensing costs and reduced marketing expenses.”225 
Countries can further introduce safeguard provisions to ensure better 
protection of human rights. A recent example is Article 27 of ACTA, 
which, as a compromise, includes safeguard clauses in three sub-provisions 
to preserve “fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair 
process, and privacy.”226 Although these clauses may be a redeeming 
feature of this controversial treaty, it remains to be seen whether they can 
alleviate the tension between intellectual property and human rights. After 
all, ACTA member states, especially the powerful ones, could deem the 
safeguard provisions “merely hortatory,” as they did in regard to Articles 7 
and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and to the Doha Declaration.
227
 The 
effectiveness of these safeguard clauses could also be undermined by a 
                                                                                                                     
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 50 (2002) (discussing the importance of the Bolar exception, 
which “makes it legal for a generic producer to import, manufacture and test a patented product 
prior to the expiry of the patent in order that it may fulfil the regulatory requirements imposed by 
particular countries as necessary for marketing as a generic”). 
 224. See High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 49 (stating that “access to affordable 
drugs can be improved by encouraging the production of generic substitutes”). 
 225. Id. ¶ 46. In a previous article, I also wrote: 
[I]f human rights are to be effectively and meaningfully protected, states not only 
need to broker human rights-based compulsory licenses, but also have to introduce 
legislation and institutions to prevent exorbitant pricing, anticompetitive behavior, 
and other market abuses. Examples of such remedial measures include compulsory 
licensing, price control, competition laws, government procurement and subsidies, 
voluntary cooperation, and international assistance and cooperation.  
Yu, supra note 11, at 1101 (footnote omitted). 
 226. ACTA, supra note 1, arts. 27.2–.4. 
 227. See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 93 (2007) (“Some observers have read ‘should’ to mean 
that Article 7 is a mere hortary [sic] provision, the interpretative value of which is equivalent to that 
of any preambular provision.”); JACQUES J. GORLIN, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL-
RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE WTO TRIPS (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY) AGREEMENT 16 (1999) 
(stating that “according to United States and EC negotiators, the language of Article 7 is hortatory 
and does not have any operational significance” and that Article 8 “was viewed by developed 
country negotiators throughout most of the negotiations as being non-operational and hortatory” 
(citing interviews with Mike Kirk and Peter Carl)); Chon, supra note 164, at 2843 (“[T]he language 
referencing development in TRIPS is not mandatory, but rather hortatory . . . .”); Peter K. Yu, The 
Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1003 (2009) (discussing 
how the choice of the word “should” in Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement “has led some industry 
groups and commentators to argue that the provision is ‘mere hortatory’”). 
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member state’s insistence that the human rights conflicts have been 
internally resolved through the flexibilities built into the intellectual 
property system. 
A better alternative, therefore, is for countries to clearly delineate the 
limitations or exceptions available to individuals. Article 6(4) of the EU 
Information Society Directive, for instance, states: 
Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that 
rightholders make available to the beneficiary of [the 
specified] exception or limitation provided for in national 
law . . . the means of benefiting from that exception or 
limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that 
exception or limitation and where that beneficiary has legal 
access to the protected work or subject-matter concerned.
228
 
Such a clearly delineated exception not only strikes a better balance in the 
intellectual property system, but also ensures the proper recognition of the 
human rights interests in individual users. 
2.  Internal Conflicts 
With respect to internal conflicts, resolution will require more 
complicated approaches. In an earlier work, I outlined three different 
approaches that can be used to resolve these conflicts: (1) just 
remuneration; (2) core minimum; and (3) progressive realization.
229
 For the 
purposes of this Article, the most important approach is just 
                                                                                                                     
 228. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 
art. 6(4), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17–18. 
 229. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1094–1123. As I noted earlier: 
The just remuneration approach is ideal for situations involving an inevitable 
conflict between two human rights—for example, between the right to the 
protection of interests in intellectual creations and the right to freedom of 
expression. Under this approach, authors and inventors hold a right to 
remuneration (rather than exclusive control) while individuals obtain a human 
rights-based compulsory license (as compared to a free license). The core 
minimum approach, in contrast, provides guidance on the minimum essential 
levels of protection a state has to offer to comply with its human rights 
obligations. That approach seeks to balance the state’s obligations against the 
inevitable constraints created by a scarcity of natural and economic resources. 
Finally, the progressive realization approach offers insight into the non-competing 
relationship amongst the different rights protected in international or regional 
human rights treaties. This final approach is important, because human rights are 
not only universal entitlements, but also empowerment rights—rights that enable 
individuals to benefit from other equally important rights. 
Yu, supra note 39, at 712–13 (footnotes omitted). 
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remuneration,
230
 which is specially designed for situations involving an 
unavoidable conflict between two sets of human rights. Under this 
approach, authors and inventors hold only a right to remuneration, as 
opposed to maintaining exclusive control; meanwhile, individuals obtain a 
human rights-based compulsory license, as compared with a free 
license).
231
 
Consider, for example, a conflict involving a newspaper’s freedom of 
expression and the author’s moral and material interests in his or her 
creation, as illustrated by the famous English case of Ashdown v. 
Telegraph Group Ltd.
232
 If the publication of a news account is of 
significant public interest and high political value (for example, when the 
author is a public figure), the human rights interest in freedom of 
expression will ensure the publication of the news account. Meanwhile, the 
author will receive proper compensation for the injury to the creative 
interest through the introduction of a human right-based compulsory 
license. Although this outcome may not please either party, it strikes a 
reasonable compromise from the human rights standpoint. 
Moreover, although international and regional human rights 
agreements offer protection to the material interests in intellectual 
creations, such protection may not reach the level stipulated in intellectual 
property, trade, or investment agreements. As the CESCR reminds us, the 
ICESCR merely covers the “basic material interests which are necessary to 
enable authors [and inventors] to enjoy an adequate standard of living.”233 
Thus, once an author or inventor has obtained an adequate standard of 
living, the human rights system may not offer additional protection. 
B.  Systemic Adjustments 
1.  Human Rights Impact Assessments 
At the systemic level, countries can consider building the necessary 
                                                                                                                     
 230. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1095–1105 (elaborating on the just remuneration approach). 
 231. See Yu, supra note 39, at 712; Yu, supra note 11,  at 1096–99; see also Alan B. Bennett, 
Reservation of Rights for Humanitarian Uses, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN 
HEALTH AND AGRICULTURE INNOVATION 41, 41 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007) (discussing 
ways to reserve rights to meet the needs of developing countries for other humanitarian purposes); 
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 301, 350–51 
(2011) (discussing “‘humanitarian licensing’”). 
 232. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1142 (Eng.). The case “concerned the publication by the Sunday 
Telegraph of a yet-to-be-published minute written by Paddy Ashdown, the former leader of the 
Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom, of his secret meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair 
shortly after the 1997 general elections.” Yu, supra note 11, at 1096. The meeting concerned the 
political cooperation between the Labor Party and the Liberal Democrats after the elections. 
Ashdown sued the newspaper for breach of confidence and copyright infringement. The newspaper 
defended by “invok[ing] both the usual defenses of fair dealing and public interest and a novel 
defense based on the newly enacted Human Rights Act of 1998.” Id. at 1096–97. 
 233. General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 2. 
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infrastructure to promote the protection of human rights. For example, a 
country can demand the inclusion of human rights impact assessments 
before the adoption of new nonmultilateral agreements or the introduction 
of new legislation that seeks to implement those agreements.
234
 The 
country can also demand such assessments for a specified period following 
the introduction of the legislation,
235
 although an ex post review is likely to 
be less effective than an ex ante review.
236
 
To be certain, human rights impact assessments are not easy to 
conduct, especially when some attributes of the intellectual property rights 
at issue have human rights status. Nevertheless, countries often undertake 
such assessments when they file reports with the monitoring arms of the 
U.N. human rights bodies. As far as quantitative assessments are 
concerned, countries can rely on indicators provided internally by national 
or local governments and nongovernmental organizations or externally by 
the U.N., the World Bank, OECD, or other intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations.
237
 
Thus far, impact assessments of law and policy have remained rare and 
piecemeal. Nevertheless, they have become increasingly common not only 
in the human rights field, but also in the areas of public health and 
                                                                                                                     
 234. See HARRISON, supra note 92, at 233 (“If States were to conduct human rights-compliant 
impact assessments as a key component of the negotiating process of any new trade agreement, this 
would be an important step in ensuring that trade law rules protect and promote human rights.”); 
WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 52 (2012) (noting the need for “mandatory, 
independently-produced, impartial, empirically rigorous impact statements before any new 
copyright legislation is passed”). 
 235. See id. at 229 (“The EU methodology . . . contains provisions requiring ‘ex post 
monitoring, evaluation and follow up of trade agreements’ so that ongoing impacts of trade 
agreements can be evaluated once the agreement in question is actually in force.” (quoting 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL TRADE, HANDBOOK FOR TRADE 
SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 9 (2006), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2006/march/tradoc_127974.pdf)); PATRY, supra note 234, at 52 (noting the need for “impact 
statements for existing laws so that we know whether existing laws need to be amended or 
repealed”). 
 236. See Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777, 
799–801 (2010) (criticizing the EU ex post evaluation of its Database Directive and distributing 
recommendations based on such an evaluation); James Boyle, Two Database Cheers for the EU, 
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2006), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/99610a50-7bb2-11da-ab8e-0000779e2340.html 
(discussing the European Commission’s first report on the Directive). 
 237. The U.N. indicators, compiled by the United Nations Statistical Division, are available at 
U.N. STAT. DIVISION, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). The 
International Human Development Indications, compiled by the United Nations Development 
Programme, are available at Human Development Reports, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). The World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators are available at Data, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (last visited Feb. 
3, 2012). Some commentators have also called for the development of “human rights 
indicators . . . with specific relevance to trade agreements and their impacts.” HARRISON, supra note 
92, at 235. 
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biological diversity.
238
 Assessment, evaluation, and impact studies also 
constitute one of the six clusters of recommendations adopted by WIPO as 
part of its Development Agenda in October 2007.
239
 
Notwithstanding the growing popularity and wider adoption of human 
rights impact assessments, one should keep these developments in 
perspective. As Professor James Harrison reminds us: “The fact that 
impact assessments have been undertaken does not mean . . . that 
governments will necessarily act to resolve any conflicts that are revealed 
in their international legal obligations.”240 It is also worth remembering 
that “developing countries may not have the capacity or infrastructure to 
undertake assessments by themselves.”241 
2.  Monitoring Mechanisms 
Countries can also take advantage of the existing human rights 
infrastructure to monitor the impact of intellectual property rights on the 
protection of human rights. For example, commentators have suggested the 
use of monitoring mechanisms to alleviate the tension between intellectual 
                                                                                                                     
 238. See, e.g., General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 35 (“States parties 
should . . . consider undertaking human rights impact assessments prior to the adoption and after a 
period of implementation of legislation for the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from one’s scientific, literary or artistic productions.”); Convention on Biological 
Diversity art. 14(1)(a), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143 (requiring contracting parties to 
“[i]ntroduce appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed 
projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to 
avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where appropriate, allow for public participation in such 
procedures”); COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 10 (2006) 
(stating that “health policies, as well as inter alia those addressing trade, the environment and 
commerce, should be equally subject to assessments as to their impact on the right to health”); 
HARRISON, supra note 92, at 228 (“Systematic environmental assessments of trade agreements are 
relatively common. Norway, the US and Canada all carry out reviews of the environmental impact 
of trade policies which include some international impact assessment, as do the United Nations 
Environment Programme and World Wildlife Fund.”). 
 239. See The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda, Cluster 
D: Assessment, Evaluation and Impact Studies, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012) 
(outlining recommendations within the assessment, evaluation, and impact studies cluster). 
 240. HARRISON, supra note 92, at 233. Nevertheless, as Professor Harrison acknowledges: 
[S]uch impact assessments can make the general public aware of the negative 
human rights impact of signing up to particular trade obligations, and become the 
basis for opposition parties, and domestic and international civil society groups, 
campaigning for changes to agreements to make them compatible with 
international human rights obligations. 
Id. 
 241. Id. at 234. 
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property and human rights.
242
 Such monitoring can occur at both the 
international and domestic levels.
243
 In addition to national governments 
and international intergovernmental organizations, it can also involve 
individuals, communities, and the private sector. 
While these monitoring mechanisms may not be as powerful as a 
mandatory conflict resolution procedure, they have significant benefits. As 
Professor Molly Beutz Land explains: 
Although these institutions do not have the ability to sanction 
or reward states based on their records of compliance other 
than by publishing conclusions regarding the state’s 
compliance, the very act of a state reporting to a committee 
fosters greater transparency, provides human rights 
organizations with an opportunity to expose and challenge 
state actions and decisions, and forces the state to provide 
reasons for its conduct.
244
 
                                                                                                                     
 242. See High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 61 (encouraging “States to monitor 
the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement to ensure that its minimum standards are achieving 
this balance between the interests of the general public and those of the authors” and supporting the 
WHO’s statement that “‘countries are advised to carefully monitor the implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement in order to formulate comprehensive proposals for the future review of the TRIPS 
Agreement’” (quoting World Health Org., Globalization, TRIPS and Access to Pharmaceuticals, 
WHO POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICINES, Mar. 2001, available at http://apps.who.int/ 
medicinedocs/pdf/s2240e/s2240e.pdf)); see also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 338–40 (1997) 
(providing an overview of the reporting process used by the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which 
is charged with the supervision of states parties’ compliance with the ICCPR). 
 243. As James Harrison states: 
It is important that impact assessments are conducted both at the international and 
national level. Individual countries need to undertake human rights assessments of 
trade liberalisation policies, and utilise these assessments in a variety of different 
ways, including[:] in WTO negotiations over future commitments; to revise their 
national policies so as to ensure they are in accordance with international human 
rights obligations; and as a defence to actions brought by other States in dispute 
settlement proceedings alleging breaches of WTO obligations. They should also 
present the information obtained before relevant Committees of the WTO. 
Individual national assessments need to be complemented by international 
assessments which can uncover trends at the regional or global level about how 
particular trade rules are impacting upon human rights in particular ways. This 
will lead to better identification of where national impact assessments should be 
focused. 
HARRISON, supra note 92, at 227 (footnotes omitted). 
 244. Land, supra note 170, at 29–30; see also Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance 
with International Environmental Agreements: The Baker’s Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1555, 1573–76 (1999) (evaluating the importance of reporting obligations in the context of 
international environmental treaties). 
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CONCLUSION 
In the past decade, high- and middle-income countries have pushed 
aggressively for the establishment of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional 
trade and investment agreements. Thus far, the high standards for 
intellectual property protection and enforcement incorporated into these 
agreements have raised significant tension between the intellectual 
property and human rights systems. While some provisions in the 
agreements arguably have strengthened those attributes of intellectual 
property rights that have human rights status, others have created 
considerable impediments to the protection of human rights. It is therefore 
imperative that countries strike a more appropriate balance between the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights and the 
commitments made in international or regional human rights instruments. 
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